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A NEW COMPACT FOR SEXUAL PRIVACY
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON*
ABSTRACT
Intimate life is under constant surveillance. Firms track people’s
periods, hot flashes, abortions, sexual assaults, sex toy use, sexual
fantasies, and nude photos. Individuals hardly appreciate the extent
of the monitoring, and even if they did, little could be done to curtail
* Jefferson Scholars Foundation Schenck Distinguished Professor in Law, University
of Virginia School of Law; Vice President, Cyber Civil Rights Initiative; 2019 MacArthur
Fellow. I am grateful to William & Mary Law School for inviting me to give the George Wythe
Lecture, to faculty and students for their thoughtful comments, and to the Law Review
(especially Geoffrey Cannon and his fellow editors) for superb suggestions. Ryan Calo,
Woodrow Hartzog, Mary Anne Franks, Neil Richards, Ari Waldman, Alan Butler, Sara Cable,
Kris Collins, Jennifer Daskal, John Davisson, Hany Farid, Ahmed Ghappour, Rebecca Green,
Debbie Hellman, Laura Heymann, Joe Jerome, Cameron Kerry, Ryan Kriger, Gary Lawson,
Tiffany Li, Linda McClain, Mike Meuer, Luis Alberto Montezuma, Jeanine Morris-Rush,
Nancy Moore, Nate Oman, David Rossman, Andrew Selbst, David Seipp, Kate Silbaugh,
Jessica Silbey, Noah Stein, Peter Swire, and David Webber provided helpful advice. Boston
University Journal of Science & Technology Law kindly asked me to present this paper as the
keynote of its 2019 data privacy symposium. Matt Atha, Rebecca Gutterman, Caroline
Hopland, and Julia Schur went above and beyond as research assistants. Tyler Gabrielski
was a constant help. The MacArthur Foundation graciously supported this work. I am
especially grateful to Dean Risa Goluboff and Vice Dean Leslie Kendrick of the University of
Virginia School of Law for their encouragement and insights.
1763
1764 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1763
it. What is big business for firms is a big risk for individuals.
Corporate intimate surveillance undermines sexual privacy—the
social norms that manage access to, and information about, human
bodies, sex, sexuality, gender, and sexual and reproductive health. At
stake is sexual autonomy, self-expression, dignity, intimacy, and
equality. So are people’s jobs, housing, insurance, and other life
opportunities. Women and minorities shoulder a disproportionate
amount of that burden.
Privacy law is failing us. Not only is the private sector’s handling
of intimate information largely unrestrained by American consumer
protection law, but it is treated as inevitable and valuable. This
Article offers a new compact for sexual privacy. Reform efforts should
focus on stemming the tidal wave of collection, restricting uses of
intimate data, and expanding the remedies available in court to
include orders to stop processing intimate data.
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INTRODUCTION
Intimate life is under constant surveillance. Apps memorialize
people’s menstruation cycles, fertility, and sexually transmitted
infections.1 Advertisers and analytics firms track searches and
browsing on adult sites.2 Sex toys monitor the frequency and inten-
sity of their owners’ use.3 Digital assistants record, transcribe, and
store conversations in bedrooms and bathrooms.4
In some contexts, people enter into relationships with the firms
tracking their intimate lives.5 This is true when individuals sub-
scribe to dating apps or purchase digital assistants.6 In other
contexts, people have no connection with the firms handling their
intimate data. Data brokers, cyber stalking apps, and sites devoted
to nonconsensual pornography and deep fake sex videos come to
mind.7
1. No Body’s Business but Mine: How Menstruation Apps Are Sharing Your Data, PRIV.
INT’L (Oct. 7, 2020),  https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3196/no-bodys-business-mine-
how-menstruations-apps-are-sharing-your-data [https://perma.cc/6TMH-2CRU].
2. See Elena Maris, Timothy Libert & Jennifer R. Henrichsen, Tracking Sex: The
Implications of Widespread Sexual Data Leakage and Tracking on Porn Websites, 22 NEW
MEDIA & SOC’Y 2018, 2025-26 (2020).
3. Steven Musil, Internet-Connected Vibrator Connects with Privacy Lawsuit, CNET
(Sept. 13, 2016, 4:15 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/internet-connected-vibrator-we-vibe-
lawsuit-privacy-data/ [https://perma.cc/XK9Y-H4X9].
4. Jennings Brown, The Amazon Alexa Eavesdropping Nightmare Came True, GIZMODO
(Dec. 20, 2018, 11:24 AM), https://gizmodo.com/the-amazon-alexa-eavesdropping-nightmare-
came-true-1831231490 [https://perma.cc/J6T7-ZXTT].
5. See, e.g., Thomas Germain, How Private Is Your Online Dating Data?, CONSUMER
REPS. (Sept. 21, 2019), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/how-private-is-your-online-
dating-data/ [https://perma.cc/MF52-4ENF]. They use online services that facilitate testing
for sexually transmitted infections and share the results with prospective partners. Kimberly
M. Aquiliana, STD Testing? Yeah, There Is an App for That, METRO (June 5, 2017),
https://www.metro.us/std-testing-yeah-theres-an-app-for-that/ [https://perma.cc/9UUM-
DVPA].
6. For instance, people subscribe to dating apps that record their sexual preferences and
favorite positions, interest in threesomes, HIV status, and hookups. See Azeen Ghorayshi &
Sri Ray, Grindr Is Letting Other Companies See User HIV Status and Location Data,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 2, 2018, 11:13 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/azeenghoray
shi/grindr-hiv-status-privacy [https://perma.cc/3PHU-5UH2]; Makena Kelly & Nick Statt,
Amazon Confirms It Holds on to Alexa Data Even if You Delete Audio Files, VERGE (July 3,
2019, 4:14 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/3/20681423/amazon-alexa-echo-chris-coons-
data-transcripts-recording-privacy [https://perma.cc/C6VQ-YWUR].
7. See Kashmir Hill, Data Broker Was Selling Lists of Rape Victims, Alcoholics, and
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Whether anticipated and expected or unknown and unwanted by
individuals, the tracking of intimate information is poised for
explosive growth. Profits drive what I have previously described as
the “collection imperative.”8 For instance, analysts predict that with-
in five years, the “femtech market”—menstruation, fertility, and
sexual wellness apps—will be a $50 billion industry.9
Personal data is the coin of the realm for our everyday products
and services.10 At some level, people understand that online services
are not actually free.11 But the firms intentionally structure the deal
in a manner that obscures its lopsided nature. Individual consumers
cannot fully grasp the potential risks, and few options exist for those
who do (beyond not using the service).12 Firms have every incentive
to reinforce the status quo, from which they earn considerable
profits.13
The surveillance of intimate life garners significant returns with
little risk for businesses.14 The opposite is true for individuals.15 The
‘Erectile Dysfunction Sufferers,’ FORBES (Dec. 19, 2013, 3:40 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/kashmirhill/2013/12/19/data-broker-was-selling-lists-of-rape-alcoholism-and-erectile-
dysfunction-sufferers/#42acebdb1d53 [https://perma.cc/9HWM-FED4]; Lorenzo Franceschi-
Bicchierai & Joseph Cox, Inside the ‘Stalkerware’ Surveillance Market, Where Ordinary People
Tap Each Other’s Phones, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 18, 2017, 8:01 AM), https://www.vice.
com/en/article/53vm7n/inside-stalkerware-surveillance-market-flexispy-retina-x [https://
perma.cc/JPB3-QYXH]; Danielle Keats Citron, Spying Inc., 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243,
1244-47 (2015) [hereinafter Citron, Spying Inc.]; Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128
YALE L.J. 1870, 1917-18 (2019) [hereinafter Citron, Sexual Privacy].
8. Danielle Keats Citron, A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy: A Review, 98 B.U. L. REV.
1139, 1141 (2018) [hereinafter Citron, A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy].
9. Drew Harwell, Is Your Pregnancy App Sharing Your Intimate Data with Your Boss?,
WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2019, 3:11 PM) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/technology/2019/04/10/tracking-your-pregnancy-an-app-may-be-more-public-
than-you-think/ [https://perma.cc/G5B9-9NKQ].
10. Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s
Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 608-10 (2014).
11. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 10-11 (2019); JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN
TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 44-46 (2019).
12. See Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 10, at 635-36, 640-41.
13. See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law 9 (July 28,
2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3642217
[https://perma.cc/ACL8-GD5E].
14. This pattern happens across the economy but is particularly problematic when it
comes to sexual privacy, as I explore throughout this Article.
15. See STIGLER COMM. ON DIGIT. PLATFORMS, STIGLER CTR. STUDY OF ECON. & STATE,
FINAL REPORT 11-12 (2019), https://www.chicagobooth.edu/research/stigler/news-and-media/
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private sector’s collection, use, storage, and disclosure of intimate
information undermines what I have elsewhere called “sexual
privacy” and “intimate privacy”—the ways people manage the
boundaries around intimate life.16 Sexual (or intimate) privacy
concerns information about, and access to, the body, particularly the
parts of the body associated with sex, gender, sexuality, and repro-
duction.17 It concerns information about, and access to, people’s sex
and gender; their sexual activities and interactions; their innermost
thoughts, desires, and fantasies; and their sexual and reproductive
health.18 This includes on- and offline activities, interactions,
communications, thoughts, and searches.19 It concerns information
about the decisions that people make about their intimate lives.20
This Article focuses on the collection, use, storage, and disclosure
of information about sexual privacy, a crucial subset of sexual
privacy. I will use the terms “intimate information” and “intimate
data” interchangeably to refer to the subject matter of this piece:
information about our bodies and health; our sexuality, gender, and
sex; and our close relationships.
Maintaining and protecting the privacy of intimate information
is foundational for interlocking interests, all of which are essential
for us to flourish as human beings.21 Privacy-afforded intimate
information enables identity- and self-development. It frees us to let
our guards down and engage in sexual and gender experimentation
and expression, alone or with trusted others (including com-
panies).22 It gives us sexual autonomy. Intimate or sexual privacy
also protects our dignity, enabling us to enjoy self-esteem and social
respect. Then, too, it frees us to form close intimate relationships
committee-on-digital-platforms-final-report [https://perma.cc/V6BM-JJM7] (“Firms that
collect and process private information do not internalize the harms associated with consumer
privacy and security breaches. Nor do they internalize negative externalities, or potential
misuses of data that impact people who are not their own consumers.”).
16. See Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 7, at 1874-75, 1880-81.




21. See id. at 1883-85.
22. See id. Sexual privacy protects the ability of people to be sexual on their own terms,
including being asexual. See id.
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with friends, lovers, and family members.23 As Charles Fried said
long ago, privacy is the precondition for love and intimacy.24 And,
lastly, it secures equal opportunity.25
Our digital services and products could be built to protect our
sexual privacy and the experimentation, expression, and intimacy
that it makes possible. They could, but they are not. Why? Simply
put, privacy is not profitable. For individuals, the costs are signifi-
cant, though we do not have a real chance to understand the extent
of the damage. Private-sector surveillance of intimate information
strips individuals of the ability to decide who learns about their
miscarriages, breakups, HIV infections, and sexual assaults, now
and long into the future. It undermines people’s self-esteem as they
see themselves as intimate parts and not as whole selves.26 When
companies categorize and rate people as rape sufferers or escort
users and nothing more, they give those individuals fractured
identities.27 People’s self-expression and association are chilled.28
Fearful of unwanted surveillance, people stop using dating apps,
fertility trackers, or digital assistants.29 They refrain from browsing
sites devoted to gender experimentation, sexuality, and reproductive
health.30
The damage may be hard for us to grasp as it is happening, but
it is no less profound or real. Intimate data reveals people’s physical
and emotional vulnerabilities, which firms exploit to their advan-
tage.31 When intimate data is leaked or disclosed to hackers and
criminals, individuals have an increased risk of reputational ruin,
blackmail, and extortion.32 When commercial hiring companies use
23. See id. See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 193-95
(2014) [hereinafter CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE].
24. See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477-78 (1968).
25. Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 7, at 1883-85.
26. See id. at 1886.
27. See id.
28. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 23, at 193-95.
29. See Jonathon W. Penney, Internet Surveillance, Regulation, and Chilling Effects
Online: A Comparative Case Study, INTERNET POL’Y REV., May 26, 2017, at 13 [hereinafter
Penney, Case Study].
30. See id. at 8-13.
31. See infra Part II.A.
32. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 744-45 (2018); Kate Fazzini, Ashley Madison Cyber-Breach: 5
Years Later, Users Are Being Targeted with ‘Sextortion’ Scams, CNBC (Jan. 31, 2020, 9:25
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intimate data to mine, rank, and rate candidates, people may be
unfairly excluded from employment opportunities.33 People’s
insurance rates may rise because algorithms predict their need for
expensive fertility treatments or gender confirmation surgeries.34
These risks are not evenly distributed across society. Women and
marginalized communities disproportionately bear the burden of
private-sector surveillance of intimate life.35 Given the way that
demeaning stereotypes work, intimate data will more often be used
to disadvantage women, sexual minorities, and racial minorities
rather than heterosexual white men.36 The femtech market will
surely have a disproportionate impact on women in healthcare,
employment, and insurance decisions.37 The majority of people
appearing on sites devoted to revenge porn and deep fake sex videos
are women and minorities.38 For people with intersecting margin-
alized identities, the harm is compounded.39 The denial of equal
opportunity in the wake of sexual privacy invasions is why I called
for the recognition of “cyber civil rights” more than a decade ago.40
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/31/ashley-madison-breach-from-2015-being-used-in-sextor
tion-scams.html [https://perma.cc/WLN2-J7F2].
33. See Ifeoma Ajunwa & Daniel Greene, Platforms at Work: Automated Hiring Platforms
and Other New Intermediaries in the Organization of Work, in 33 RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY
OF WORK, WORK AND LABOR IN THE DIGITAL AGE 61, 79 (Steven P. Vallas & Anne Kovalainen
eds., 2019). See generally Marie Hicks, Hacking the Cis-tem: Transgender Citizens and the
Early Digital State, 41 IEEE ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING 20, 28 (2019); SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE,
ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM 123-25 (2018).
34. Jaden Urbi, Some Transgender Drivers Are Being Kicked Off Uber’s App, CNBC (Aug.
13, 2018, 9:21 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/08/transgender-uber-driver-suspended-
tech-oversight-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/4X59-3T3W]; SARAH MYERS WEST,
MEREDITH WHITTAKER & KATE CRAWFORD, AI NOW INSTITUTE, DISCRIMINATING SYSTEMS:
GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN AI 17-18 (2019), https://ainowinstitute.org/discriminatingsys
tems.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JD9-VS57].
35. See Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 7, at 1928.
36. Id.; CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 23, at 9-17.
37. As suggested above, this is the direct result of the data collection campaigns of
femtech companies.
38. See Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 7, at 1919-20, 1924.
39. See Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 464
(2017); see also Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 7, at 1892-93; Joy Buolamwini & Timnit
Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender
Classification, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 77, 88 (2018).
40. See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 84-85 (2009)
[hereinafter Citron, Cyber Civil Rights].
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Despite the enormity of these potential harms, intimate informa-
tion lacks meaningful legal protection. American law generally
treats privacy as a consumer protection matter. It focuses on
policing firms’ notice to consumers about their data practices and
any deception associated with those practices.41 For the most part,
the collection, use, storage, and sharing of intimate data are enabled
by this approach rather than restricted by it.42 Tracking intimate
data is not just permissible. It is viewed as beneficial.43 But the
truth of the matter is that human flourishing is being impaired, not
secured.
This Article offers a new compact for the protection of intimate
information. As a start, we need to revise our understanding of the
privacy afforded to intimate life. Treating sexual privacy as a
consumer protection problem underestimates the interests at stake.
The surveillance of intimate life matters—not just because firms fail
to provide notice or engage in deceptive practices but also because
they undermine autonomy, dignity, intimacy, and equality. It
matters because people’s crucial life opportunities, including
employment, education, housing, insurance, professional certifica-
tion, and self-expression, are on the line. It matters because our core
capabilities hang in the balance.
All personal data needs protection, but even more so for intimate
information.44 Intimate information should not be collected or
processed without meaningful consent—knowing, voluntary, and
exceptional. Firms should not use intimate information to manipu-
late people to act against their interests. Firms should have robust
obligations of confidentiality, discretion, and loyalty when handling
intimate data. Available remedies should include injunctive relief
ordering firms to stop processing intimate data until legal commit-
ments are satisfied. Repeated violations can and should result in the
41. See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, supra note 13, at 38, 40-41.
42. See id.
43. Julie E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 11 (2019)
(explaining that the collection and processing of personal data are “position[ed] ... as virtuous
and productive, and therefore ideally exempted from state control”).
44. See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S.CAL.L.REV. 1125, 1128-29 (2015); Danielle
Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of
the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 244-45 (2007) [hereinafter Citron, Reservoirs of
Danger].
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“data death penalty”—forbidding a firm’s handling of personal data
now and in the future.45 Given that with enough personal data we
can infer intimate information, all personal data deserves strong
protection.46
This Article has three parts. Part I provides a snapshot into the
corporate surveillance of intimate life. It categorizes the surveil-
lance into first- and third-party data collection. Part II highlights
the damage that corporate intimate surveillance causes to the
values that sexual privacy secures and the harm to human well-
being that it inflicts. It provides an overview of the legal landscape
and the extent to which law is failing us. Part III offers a plan of
action for the protection of intimate information. It provides guide-
posts for regulating the private sector’s surveillance of intimate
information, and it suggests affirmative obligations for firms and
additional remedies.
45. See infra Part III.A.3. Thanks to Woodrow Hartzog for suggesting the concept of the
“data death penalty” to describe stop processing orders.
46. There is terrific scholarship on the contours of strong baseline privacy protections. See
generally Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1461 (2019) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Pathologies of Digital Consent];
Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD.L.REV. 952
(2017) [hereinafter Hartzog, Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices]; Neil Richards
& Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431
(2016); Woodrow Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUR.DATAPROT.L.REV. 423
(2018) [hereinafter Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control]; Richards & Hartzog, supra
note 13. Cameron Kerry has been thoughtfully exploring the various proposals for data
privacy reform at the federal level. See, e.g., Cameron F. Kerry, Protecting Privacy in an AI-
Driven World, BROOKINGS (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/protecting-
privacy-in-an-ai-driven-world/ [https://perma.cc/8J4T-VU8K]; Cameron Kerry, Data Collection
Standards in Privacy Legislation: Proposed Language, LAWFARE (Apr. 10, 2019, 11:20 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/data-collection-standards-privacy-legislation-proposed-language
[https://perma.cc/6K7W-YL6X] [hereinafter Kerry, Proposed Language]; Cameron F. Kerry,
Op-Ed: A Federal Privacy Law Could Do Better than California’s, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019,
3:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-kerry-ccpa-data-privacy-laws-201904
25-story.html [https://perma.cc/QR6Y-MA69]; Cameron F. Kerry & John B. Morris, Jr., Why
Data Ownership Is the Wrong Approach to Protecting Privacy, BROOKINGS (June 26, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/06/26/why-data-ownership-is-the-wrong-
approach-to-protecting-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/QT9S-SNAD].
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I. UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE-SECTOR SURVEILLANCE OF
INTIMATE LIFE
This Part gives us a glimpse of the private sector’s wide-ranging
surveillance of intimate life.47 First, Section A describes scenarios of
first-party collection—or instances in which people have relation-
ships with businesses collecting their intimate information. Then,
Section B gives examples of third-party collection—or instances in
which people lack a direct relationship with private entities han-
dling their intimate information. I use the concepts of first- and
third-party data collection to organize the varied commercial
scenarios in which intimate information is collected, processed,
used, and shared.48
A. Cataloging First-Party Collection
Businesses routinely gather intimate information directly from
individuals.49 First-party collection occurs on sites related to sexual
47. Karen Levy has a wonderful short symposium piece focusing on surveillance practices
in the home, often (though not always) involving consensual intimate partners. Karen E.C.
Levy, Intimate Surveillance, 51 IDAHO L.REV. 679 (2015). In that work, Professor Levy divides
intimate surveillance into three categories: dating, tracking intimate and romantic partners,
and fertility monitoring. Id. at 681-86. In this Article, I explore the collection, use, sharing,
and storage of information relating to all aspects of intimate life, including—but not limited
to—the home, building on my work on commercial databases of sensitive information, cyber
civil rights, nonconsensual pornography, cyber stalking apps, sexual privacy, and deep fakes.
See Citron, Reservoirs of Danger, supra note 44; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 40;
Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 345 (2014); Danielle Keats Citron, Protecting Sexual Privacy in the Information Age,
in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE 46 (Marc Rotenberg, Julia Horwitz & Jeramie Scott eds.,
2015); Citron, Spying Inc., supra note 7; Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 7; Danielle Keats
Citron, Why Sexual Privacy Matters for Trust, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1189 (2019) [hereinafter
Citron, Why Sexual Privacy Matters for Trust]; Bobby Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, Deep
Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L.
REV. 1753 (2019). I discuss first- and third-party data collection as a way to understand the
broad array of firms involved in collecting, using, sharing, and storing intimate information.
48. It is worth noting that while the very concept of first- and third-party data collection
makes those processes seem normal and routine, they are anything but. I am using those
shorthand references given their prevalence in public conversation.
49. See Levy, supra note 47, at 679-80.
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and reproductive health, porn sites, dating apps, and personal
devices.50
1. Our Bodies: Our Sexual and Reproductive Health
Countless websites and apps are devoted to the collection of
information about our bodies, including our sexual and reproductive
health. These sites and apps let people track their sex lives—
including when they had sex, with whom, whether they used
protection—and when they masturbate.51 Some platforms host
community forums where subscribers can connect with each other
to discuss their sex lives.52 Health apps let users track their sexual
activity.53 A start-up founded by five men claims that its app
developed an algorithm that identifies and proves female orgasms.54
Some sexual health start-ups are focused on men.55 For instance,
Ro sends erectile dysfunction drugs directly to consumers.56 Hims
provides treatments for male hair and sexual issues.57 Each firm
raised more than $80 million in financing.58
Far more extensive, however, is the tracking of women’s health.
The term “femtech” describes apps, services, products, and sites that
50. See Emma McGowan, How Tracking Your Sex Life Can Make It Better & 7 Apps to,




53. Lux Alptraum, Apple’s Health App Now Tracks Sexual Activity, and That’s a Big
Opportunity, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 23, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/
8q8kpk/apples-health-app-now-tracks-sexual-activityand-that-a-big-opportunity [https://
perma.cc/8QJT-VFSL].
54. See RELIDA LIMITED, https://www.relidalimited.com/ [https://perma.cc/4J5P-D427];
Rachel Moss, 5 Guys Created an Algorithm to ‘Validate the Female Orgasm’. It Went as Well
as You’d Expect, HUFFINGTON POST UK (June 12, 2020), https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/
entry/5-guys-created-an-algorithm-to-validate-the-female-orgasm-and-it-went-as-well-as-
youd-expect_uk_5ee0dc35c5b6cdc3fd432666 [https://perma.cc/CR5M-RV6V] (noting that
Relida Limited was founded by five men and that the company claimed on its website that the
app’s algorithm was created by a woman). After some bad publicity, the start-up’s website now
says that it is meant to measure orgasms of men and women. See RELINDA LIMITED, supra.
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collect information about women’s period cycles, fertility, pregnan-
cies, menopause, and sexual and reproductive histories.59 Nearly
one-third of women in the United States have used period-tracking
apps.60 Menstrual tracking apps “are the fourth most popular health
app among adults and the second most popular among adolescent
females.”61 The start-up Gennev provides a “free” online menopause
health assessment that “collects 72 data points—and nearly 35,000
women took it in 2019.”62 Menopause start-ups have raised more
than $250 million from 2009 to 2019.63 Overall, femtech start-ups
raised nearly $500 million in 2019 alone.64
Subscribers of menstrual tracking apps enter, among other
things, their weight, temperatures, moods, reading material, sexual
encounters, tampon use, alcohol consumption, cigarette and coffee
habits, bodily secretions, and birth control pills.65 Apple’s Health
59. Harwell, supra note 9.
60. Donna Rosato, What Your Period Tracker App Knows About You, CONSUMER REPS.
(Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/health-privacy/what-your-period-tracker-
app-knows-about-you/ [https://perma.cc/B6PN-A5UW]. There are also fertility apps that track
women’s menstrual cycles and pregnancy apps that monitor women’s habits, mood, fetal
movements, and more. See Vanessa Rizk & Dalia Othman, Quantifying Fertility and
Reproduction Through Mobile Apps: A Critical Overview, 22 ARROW FOR CHANGE 13, 13-14
(2016). Some apps, such as Glow, cover all aspects of fertility, including tracking women’s
cycles, fertility, pregnancy, and a baby’s development in the first year. E.g., Jerry Beilinson,
Glow Pregnancy App Exposed Women to Privacy Threats, Consumer Report Finds, CONSUMER
REPS. (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/mobile-security-software/glow-
pregnancy-app-exposed-women-to-privacy-threats/ [https://perma.cc/AQK7-TZS6].
61. See Michelle L. Moglia, Henry V. Nguyen, Kathy Chyjek, Katherine T. Chen & Paula
M. Castaño, Evaluation of Smartphone Menstrual Cycle Tracking Applications Using an
Adapted APPLICATIONS Scoring System, 127 OBSTETRICS&GYNECOLOGY 1153, 1153 (2016)
(footnote omitted).
62. Eliza Haverstrock, Narrative Change: VCs Are Finally Ready to Talk About Meno-




65. See No Body’s Business but Mine, supra note 1. For instance, the app Clue goes further
and asks subscribers to track “not just [the] dates and details of periods and menstrual
cycles,” but also their discharge of cervical fluids, their use of medication, and their sex life,
injections, illnesses, and cervical position. See Sadaf Khan, Data Bleeding Everywhere: A Story
of Period Trackers, DEEPDIVES (June 7, 2019), https://deepdives.in/data-bleeding-everywhere-
a-story-of-period-trackers-8766dc6a1e00 [https://perma.cc/UD2K-PQXF]. The Ovia Fertility
app lets users indicate the consistency of their cervical discharge, from “egg whites, water, or
a bottle of school glue.” Id. Period-tracking apps are also marketed to people’s partners so that
they can manage their relationships around menstrual cycles. Levy, supra note 47, at 685-86
(discussing apps such as PMSTracker and iAmAMan, which enable subscribers to track
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app syncs with period and fertility tracking apps and allows sub-
scribers to track their sexual activity.66 The Flo app provides extra
features such as period predictions and health reports that can be
shared with doctors.67 Some services let subscribers obtain discounts
on products, such as tampons.68
Consider the Eve Glow app.69 Subscribers must record their sex
drive status with the following choices: “DO ME NOW,” “I’m down,”
or “MIA.”70 To complete their health log, subscribers must input
whether they orgasmed during sex.71 The app’s screen enables
subscribers to answer “YASSS,” “No,” or “Faked It.”72 They are
asked to indicate whether they are experiencing cramps, tender
breasts, or bloating.73
Femtech apps like Eve Glow host discussion boards where people
using the services talk to each other about their intimate lives,
including their experiences with sex, fertility, abortions, or miscar-
riages.74 A user of Eve Glow explained that she “kind of lose[s her]
inhibition because so many other women are talking about” their
intimate lives on the discussion boards.75 The apps track and store
those communications.76
Three million people use Glow’s suite of apps, which include Eve
Glow, Glow, Glow Nurture, and Glow Baby.77 The company is part
of HVF Labs, whose “objective is to take advantage of potential low
multiple women’s cycles and use multiple passwords to allow users to conceal their tracking
activity).
66. Alptraum, supra note 53. Some apps are exclusively designed to track people’s sexual
activity. For example, the BedPost app allows subscribers to track the names of sexual part-
ners, track the dates of sexual experiences, and rank those sexual experiences. See BEDPOST,
http://www.bedposted.com [https://perma.cc/2JAD-V8FL].
67. See Rosato, supra note 60.
68. Id.
69. EVE GLOW, https://glowing.com/apps [https://perma.cc/T99X-UD2V].







77. See Natasha Felizi & Joana Varon, MENSTRUAPPS—How to Turn Your Period into
Money (for Others), CODINGRIGHTS:CHUPADADOS, https://chupadados.codingrights.org/en/men
struapps-como-transformar-sua-menstruacao-em-dinheiro-para-os-outros/ [https://perma.cc/
NGJ2-3NFG].
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cost sensors, the gradual increase in access to broadband, and the
high storage capacity to collect and explore data as a commodity.”78
Glow’s privacy policy says that the company may decide to share
information collected on the app with third parties to inform users
about goods and services including those conducting medical
research.79 Only some of the user data shared is “made anony-
mous.”80
Businesses pair health devices with apps to track individuals’
intimate data. Looncup, for instance, is poised to offer a smart
menstrual cup that records the volume and color of menstrual fluid
on its app, ostensibly for health benefits.81 Trackle links a vaginal
thermometer with an app measuring women’s inner temperature.82
Reproductive health apps market themselves as providing expert
advice.83 Yet many such apps—particularly those that are “free”—
are riddled with inaccurate information.84 In one study, researchers
evaluated 108 free menstrual cycle tracking apps and concluded
that more than 80 percent of them were “inaccurate, contain[ed]
misleading health information, or d[id] not function.”85
Femtech apps also have been prone to security problems. In 2016,
Consumer Reports found that anyone could access Glow subscribers’
health data, including the dates of abortions and sexual encounters,
if they had their email addresses.86 Flo was caught sending Face-
book subscribers’ information, including when they were trying to
conceive and having their periods.87
78. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., LOONCUP—The World’s First SMART Menstrual Cup, KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/700989404/looncup-the-worlds-first-smart-menstrual-
cup [https://perma.cc/M7Q9-YZUW].
82. How Trackle Works, TRACKLE, https://trackle.de/en/about-trackle-2/how-trackle-works/
[https://perma.cc/34WJ-T5F9].
83. See, e.g., EVE GLOW, supra note 69.
84. See Moglia et al., supra note 61, at 1157.
85. Id.
86. Beilinson, supra note 60.
87. See Sam Schechner & Mark Secada, You Give Apps Sensitive Personal Information.
Then They Tell Facebook, WALLST.J. (Feb. 22, 2019, 11:07 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
you-give-apps-sensitive-personal-information-then-they-tell-facebook-11550851636 [https://
perma.cc/4BHA-BNZB]
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2. Adult Sites
Pornography sites collect and store a wealth of information about
people’s sexual interests, desires, and sexual practices.88 They track
people’s search queries, the time and frequency of their visits, and
private chats.89 The most popular free porn site, PornHub, reports
that some of the most searched terms on the site include “lesbian,”
“milf,” “step mom,” and “teen.”90 The very nature of some adult sites
reveals people’s sexual interests, such as bestiality or incest sites.91
Some specialty sites require members to provide email addresses,
passwords, and credit card information.92 A zoophilia forum accumu-
lated personal information for about 71,000 individuals, including
usernames, birth dates, and IP addresses.93 Rosebuttboard.com, a
forum dedicated to “extreme anal dilation and anal fisting,” re-
corded the personal information of 100,000 user accounts, including
the email addresses of military members and federal employees.94
Adult sites are some of the most popular sites online. They garner
more visitors a month than Amazon, Netflix, and Twitter
88. Maris et al., supra note 2, at 2019.
89. See id.
90. See The 2019 Year in Review, PORNHUB INSIGHTS (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.
pornhub.com/insights/2019-year-in-review#searches [https://perma.cc/D3Y8-WHKD]; see also
Michael Castleman, Surprising New Data from the World’s Most Popular Porn Site, PSYCH.
TODAY (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/all-about-sex/201803/surpris
ing-new-data-the-world-s-most-popular-porn-site [https://perma.cc/377Z-K8WQ].
91. Maris et al., supra note 2, at 2027.
92. Joseph Cox, Thousands of Bestiality Website Users Exposed in Hack, VICE: MOTHER-
BOARD (Mar. 29, 2018, 1:59 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/evqvpz/bestiality-website
hacked-troy-hunt-have-i-been-pwned [https://perma.cc/VY5W-3AUW] (explaining that hack
of bestiality site revealed more than 3,000 users’ email addresses as well as users’ password
hashes, birthdates, IP addresses, and private messages).
93. See Have I Been Pwned (@haveibeenpwned), TWITTER (Oct. 19, 2019, 5:25 PM), https://
twitter.com/haveibeenpwned/status/1185668262538838016 [https://perma.cc/8XDD-F34B].
Hackers exposed the personal details of the users of the bestiality site online. Waqas, Animal
Abuse Website Hacked; Thousands of Users Exposed, HACKREAD (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.
hackread.com/animal-abuse-website-hacked-users-exposed/ [https://perma.cc/335L-5K8T].
94. Joseph Cox, Another Day, Another Hack: Is Your Fisting Site Updating Its Forum
Software?, VICE:MOTHERBOARD (May 10, 2016, 9:54 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/
qkjj4p/rosebuttboard-ip-board [https://perma.cc/8YKX-DYXT]; Jonathan Keane, Hack Shows
Government and Military Employees Used Their Email Addresses on Hardcore Fetish Site,
DIGIT. TRENDS (May 13, 2016), https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/rosebutt-hack/
[https://perma.cc/9RDE-EDUN]; Troy Hunt (@troyhunt), TWITTER (May 10, 2016, 10:06 AM),
https://twitter.com/troyhunt/status/730036184651431937 [https://perma.cc/EMZ5-6SNF].
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combined.95 In 2018, PornHub had 33.5 billion visits.96 It had an
average of 63,000 visitors per minute.97 In 2019, that number grew
to 80,000 visitors per minute.98
3. Dating Apps
Dating apps and services collect broad swaths of people’s intimate
information, including their names, photographs, occupations,
locations, relationship status, romantic or sexual interests, sexual
orientation, interest in extramarital affairs, and sexually transmit-
ted infections.99 Adults are not the only ones on dating apps;
teenagers also subscribe to Tinder, MeetMe, Hot or Not, MyLOL,
and Kik.100 Such sites are commonly used by LGBTQ youth who lack
supportive networks at school to connect with others.101
Simple behaviors on these apps and sites, such as how long a user
views a particular profile or image, can reveal the characteristics or
features that a person looks for in a romantic partner.102 Journalist
Judith Duportail discovered just how extensive her disclosures to
95. Maris et al., supra note 2, at 2019.
96. Digital Fingerprints: How the Porn You Watch May Be Watching You, FIGHT THE
NEWDRUG (Feb. 15, 2019), https://fightthenewdrug.org/how-your-porn-may-be-watching-you/
[https://perma.cc/L9N7-HFX4].
97. Can You Guess 2018’s Most-Viewed Categories on the Largest Porn Site?, FIGHT THE
NEWDRUG (July 9, 2019), https://fightthenewdrug.org/pornhub-visitors-in-2018-and-review-of-
top-searches/ [https://perma.cc/3STF-AV9J].
98. The 2019 Year in Review, supra note 90.
99. See Thomas Germain, How Private Is Your Online Dating Data?, CONSUMER REPS.
(Sept. 21, 2019), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/how-private-is-your-online-dating-
data/ [https://perma.cc/MF52-4ENF] (“You might never choose to share those thousands of
intimate facts with a friend or family member, but if you use dating apps, you are providing
the information to companies that will collect and retain every detail.”); see also Michael
Zimmer, OKCupid Study Reveals the Perils of Big-Data Science, WIRED (May 14, 2016, 7:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/okcupid-study-reveals-perils-big-data-science/ [https://
perma.cc/DN53-CJRL]. It is worth noting the rise of dating intelligence apps like Lulu. This
app “allows women to anonymously review and rate men.” See Dating Intelligence App Lulu
Acquired by Badoo, PITCHBOOK (Feb. 10, 2016), https://pitchbook.com/newsletter/dating-
intelligence-app-lulu-acquired-by-badoo [https://perma.cc/427V-HM6Q]. Lulu raised $6 million
in venture funding and was acquired by Badoo in 2016. Id.
100. Christine Elgersma, Tinder and 7 More Dating Apps Teens Are Using, COMMONSENSE
MEDIA (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/blog/tinder-and-7-more-dating-
apps-teens-are-using [https://perma.cc/PVT4-4659]. Teenagers can access some of these apps
via Facebook. Id.
101. Id.
102. Germain, supra note 99.
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Tinder were when the company complied with her request for her
records as required by the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR).103 The company returned eight hundred pages detailing
her activities and interactions.104 A review of the 1,700 messages
Duportail sent through the app revealed her “hopes, fears, sexual
preferences and deepest secrets.”105
All of this intimate information is ripe for exploitation and dis-
closure.106 In some cases, this data may appear in the profiles of
potential matches.107 As explored below, it may be shared with
advertisers and other firms.108
And firms’ data collections may be inadequately secured and
stolen. Hackers have targeted dating services to steal intimate
103. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].
104. Judith Duportail, I Asked Tinder for My Data. It Sent Me 800 Pages of My Deepest,
Darkest Secrets, GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2017, 2:10 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technol
ogy/2017/sep/26/tinder-personal-data-dating-app-messages-hacked-sold [https://perma.cc/
WS2Z-U2J2]. The documents included Duportail’s Facebook likes and number of friends, links
to her Instagram photos, her education, the age-range of men she was interested in, the
number of times she opened the app, the number of people she matched with, and where and
when each conversation with a match took place. Id. Facebook started a dating app in 2019.
Nathan Sharp, It’s Facebook Official, Dating Is Here, FACEBOOK (Sept. 5, 2019), https://about.
fb.com/news/2019/09/facebook-dating/ [https://perma.cc/Q5CZ-QKVD] (announcing the launch
of Facebook’s dating app); see also Charlie Warzel, Don’t Trust Facebook With Your Love Life,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/05/opinion/facebook-dating-
app.html [https://perma.cc/H45K-UPG4].
105. Duportail, supra note 104.
106. Id. (“Tinder’s privacy policy clearly states: ‘you should not expect that your personal
information, chats, or other communications will always remain secure.’”); see also Privacy
Policy, TINDER, https://www.gotinder.com/privacy [https://perma.cc/8UL2-TFVN] (“As with
all technology companies, although we take steps to secure your information, we do not
promise, and you should not expect, that your personal information will always remain
secure.”).
107. In 2016, Danish researchers refused to anonymize a data set containing 70,000 OK
Cupid users’ “usernames, age, gender, location, what kind of relationship (or sex) they’re
interested in, personality traits, and answers to thousands of profiling questions.” Zimmer,
supra note 99. The researchers argued that the information was already “publicly available,”
though Zimmer notes that this is not entirely accurate. Id. “Since OkCupid users have the
option to restrict the visibility of their profiles to logged-in users only, it is likely the research-
ers collected—and subsequently released—profiles that were intended to not be publicly
viewable.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
108. See infra Part I.B.
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information in order to blackmail and extort subscribers.109 In 2015,
a data breach resulted in hackers publishing online the personal
details of subscribers to Ashley Madison, a site for people seeking
extramarital affairs. Millions of subscribers’ names, emails, sexual
preferences, and sexual desires were posted online in a searchable
format.110 Criminals continue to use the intimate information
shared with Ashley Madison in extortion schemes.111
Membership of or browsing on particular dating sites may reveal
someone’s sexual preferences and habits.112 In October 2016,
hackers obtained 412 million account records from Friend Finder
Networks.113 The information exposed included “email addresses,
109. Lily Hay Newman, Hacks, Nudes, and Breaches: It’s Been a Rough Month for Dating
Apps, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/ok-cupid-dating-apps-
hacks-breaches-security/ [https://perma.cc/SE99-ZWPS] (“The same factors that make dating
sites an appealing target for hackers also make them useful for romance scams: It’s easier to
assess and approach people on a site that are already meant for sharing information with
strangers.”).
110. Zak Doffman, Ashley Madison Hack Returns to ‘Haunt’ Its Victims: 32 Million Users
Now Watch and Wait, MEDIUM (Feb. 1, 2020, 7:06 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoff
man/2020/02/01/ashley-madison-hack-returns-to-haunt-its-victims-32-million-users-now-have-
to-watch-and-wait/#6151c2395677 [https://perma.cc/6QNP-NHCU] (explaining that the Ashley
Madison hack resulted in the leaking of intimate information of 32 million people). Ashley
Madison touted its service as enabling “infidelity and married dating.” Kim Zetter, Hackers
Finally Post Stolen Ashley Madison Data, WIRED (Aug. 18, 2015, 5:55 PM), https://www.wired.
com/2015/08/happened-hackers-posted-stolen-ashley-madison-data/ [https://perma.cc/P672-
Z6YF]. The data released by hackers included names, passwords, addresses, and phone
numbers submitted by users of the site. Id. Also included were users’ credit card transactions,
revealing people’s real names and addresses. Id. The data dump revealed members’ sexual
fantasies and desires, such as “I like lots of foreplay and stamina, fun, discretion, oral, even
willingness to experiment.” Id. As Karen Levy wisely noted, “The real benefit of self-tracking
is always to the company.... People are being asked to do this at a time when they’re
incredibly vulnerable and may not have any sense where that data is being passed.” Harwell,
supra note 9 (quoting Cornell professor Karen Levy). Nor do they realize how easy it is to re-
identify such information. See id.
111. Doffman, supra note 110 (explaining that victims of Ashley Madison hack continue to
receive emails with embarrassing details from the breach and with demands for bitcoin
ransoms to be paid in “a limited amount of time”).
112. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 92; Michelle Broder Van Dyke, Pastor Exposed by Ashley
Madison Hack Kills Himself, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 8, 2015, 8:52 PM), https://www.buzz
feednews.com/article/mbvd/pastor-exposed-by-ashley-madison-hack-commits-suicide [https://
perma.cc/HE5H-7GXB].
113. Samuel Gibbs, Adult Friend Finder and Penthouse Hacked in Massive Personal Data
Breach, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2016, 6:21 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/
nov/14/adult-friend-finder-and-penthouse-hacked-in-largest-personal-data-breach-on-record
[https://perma.cc/B56T-EWXS] (“Among the leaked account details were 78,301 US military
email addresses, 5,650 US government email addresses and over 96 [million] Hotmail
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passwords, dates of last visits, browser information, IP addresses
and site membership status across sites run by Friend Finder Net-
works,” including Adult Friend Finder, Cams.com, Penthouse.com,
and three other sites.114 Three years later, a hacker obtained
250,000 “email addresses, usernames, IP addresses, and hashed
passwords” from the Dutch sex-work forum Hookers.nl where
“clients discuss[ed] their experiences with sex workers.”115
4. Personal Devices
An array of devices records people’s intimate activities and
interactions. Sex toys are obvious examples. We-Vibe, a networked
vibrator, allows subscribers to control others’ devices via an app.116
The app also enables partners to communicate with each other via
text or video chat.117 The Lioness vibrator similarly enables sub-
scribers to live stream “what’s going on in the moment” and permits
partners to remotely control the device.118 Companies sell Wi-Fi
accounts. The [leak] ... also included the details of what appear to be almost 16 [million]
deleted accounts.”).
114. Id. “This is not the first time Adult Friend Network has been hacked. In May 2015 the
personal details of almost four million users were leaked by hackers, including their login
details, emails, dates of birth, post codes, sexual preferences and whether they were seeking
extramarital affairs.” Id. The inclusion of data from Penthouse.com in the 2016 breach was
particularly concerning as Friend Finder Networks sold the site to Penthouse Global Media
in February 2016. Id.
115. Samantha Cole & Joseph Cox, A Hacker Stole 250k User Account Details from a Dutch
Sex Work Site, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 10, 2019, 10:32 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/
article/d3a5gy/hacker-stole-user-account-details-from-a-dutch-sex-work-site-hookers-nl
[https://perma.cc/R4V4-T7G7] (“Although prostitution is legal and regulated in the Nether-
lands, people still seek anonymity when they’re buying services—whether from websites like
Hookers.nl or in person at brothels.”); Thomas Brewster, Dutch Prostitution Site Hookers.nl
Hacked—250,000 Users’ Data Leaked, FORBES (Oct. 10, 2019, 8:43 AM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/thomasbrewster/2019/10/10/dutch-prostitution-site-hookersnl-hacked--250000-users-
data-leaked/?sh=41fadb1822f8 [https://perma.cc/WG74-VGUB] (“Dutch broadcaster NOS,
which broke the story ... viewed some of the data and said it could determine some real names
of users.”).
116. Musil, supra note 3.
117. Id.
118. Now You Can See Your Orgasm in Real Time, LIONESS (Apr. 15, 2019), https://blog.
lioness.io/now-you-can-see-your-orgasm-in-real-time-359afbdfa6d0 [https://perma.cc/N8ST-
BYE3]. We-Vibe recorded the dates and times of a vibrator’s use and the intensity and mode
selected by subscribers without their consent, leading to a class action lawsuit discussed in
Part II. See Amended Class Action Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 1-2, N.P. v.
Standard Innovation Corp., Case No. 1:16-cv-8655 (E.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2017).
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enabled butt plugs, vibrating masturbators for men, and devices for
the penis that track thrusting.119 Like many consumer goods,
internet-connected sex toys are not developed with privacy and secu-
rity in mind.120
While voice-enabled personal assistants that listen to and record
people’s activities are less obviously related to intimate life, they are
no less important.121 Amazon’s Echo and other Alexa-enabled
devices are marketed as in-home hubs for managing day-to-day
tasks.122 They record people’s communications, storing them as voice
recordings and text transcripts in the cloud.123 Amazon retains text
transcripts even after subscribers choose to delete the saved audio
files of their voice interactions with the device.124
According to researchers, voice-activated assistants, such as
Alexa and Echo, do not only wake and record when subscribers say
the “wake word.”125 Indeed, the systems are error prone and have
recorded intimate conversations.126 Apple’s Siri has captured
recordings of sexual encounters.127 Computer science researchers at
Northeastern University conducted a study of smart speakers by
exposing devices to three audiobooks and nine episodes of the
119. Emily Dreyfuss, Don’t Get Your Valentine an Internet-Connected Sex Toy, WIRED
(Feb. 14, 2019, 10:02 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/internet-connected-sex-toys-security/
[https://perma.cc/ER73-9LFK]; Rebecca “Burt” Rose, How Fit Is Your Dick, Exactly? The Sex-
Fit Ring Knows All the Answers, JEZEBEL (Aug. 8, 2014, 6:10 PM), https://jezebel.com/how-fit-
is-your-dick-exactly-the-sexfit-ring-knows-al-1618065007 [https://perma.cc/YQX8-DBMR].
120. See IoD Goals, INTERNET OF DONGS PROJECT, https://internetofdon.gs/about/ [https://
perma.cc/F9K8-M9RC]. Security researchers involved in “The Internet of Dongs Project”
report on security vulnerabilities and work with companies interested in fixing problems. Id.
The researchers have published guidance documents on the reporting of security
vulnerabilities and ensuring secure software development lifecycle to prevent vulnerabilities
from occurring in the first place. Vendor Resources, INTERNET OF DONGS PROJECT, https://
internetofdon.gs/vendor-resources/ [https://perma.cc/SK3H-WD3T].
121. Alex Hern, Apple Contractors ‘Regularly Hear Confidential Details’ on Siri Recordings,
GUARDIAN (July 26, 2019, 12:34 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/26/
apple-contractors-regularly-hear-confidential-details-on-siri-recordings [https://perma.cc/
DB24-B927].
122. Kelly & Statt, supra note 6.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Allen St. John, Smart Speakers that Listen When They Shouldn’t, CONSUMER REPS.
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.consumerreports.org/smart-speakers/smart-speakers-that-listen-
when-they-shouldnt/ [https://perma.cc/WK4T-2KH4].
126. Id.; Hern, supra note 121.
127. Hern, supra note 121.
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television show Gilmore Girls.128 Their study found 63 false positives
in 21 hours—meaning that the home devices recorded 63 conversa-
tions that it should not have in a 21-hour time span.129
Amazon employs thousands of people worldwide to analyze and
transcribe voice clips to improve Alexa’s accuracy.130 Some employ-
ees have watched people’s home camera footage.131 One German
Amazon customer inadvertently received hundreds of Alexa record-
ings and transcripts from another user in response to a GDPR
request in August 2018.132 The person could be heard in multiple
locations, including the shower, as could a frequent female guest.133
A German magazine found it “fairly easy to identify the person
involved and his female companion” using “[w]eather queries, first
names, and even someone’s last name.”134 In July 2019, Google ad-
mitted to a similar breach after a contractor shared with a news site
more than one thousand sound recordings of customer conversations
made by Google Assistant.135 Included in the recordings were people
talking about medical conditions.136
Amazon plans to expand Alexa’s reach, with one executive telling
the New York Times that “[t]here is no reason not to put them
everywhere in your house.”137 Amazon has released a tiny version of
128. St. John, supra note 125.
129. Id.
130. Aimee Picchi, Amazon Workers Are Listening to What You Tell Alexa, CBSNEWS (Apr.
11, 2019, 12:35 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazon-workers-are-listening-to-what-
you-tell-alexa/ [https://perma.cc/WF5F-ZX3L].
131. Natalia Drozdiak, Giles Turner & Matthew Day, Amazon Workers May Be Watching
Your Cloud Cam Home Footage, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2019, 5:56 PM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2019-10-10/is-amazon-watching-you-cloud-cam-footage-reviewed-by-humans
[https://perma.cc/R32W-338H].
132. Brown, supra note 4. Amazon later claimed this occurred because of a “one-time error”
by a staff member and disabled the link that provided access to the data. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Todd Haselton, Google Admits Partners Leaked More than 1,000 Private Conversations
with Google Assistant, CNBC (July 11, 2019, 1:11 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/11/
google-admits-leaked-private-voice-conversations.html [https://perma.cc/582V-HZR3].
136. Id.
137. Karen Weise, Amazon Wants Alexa to Move (With You) Far Beyond the Living Room,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/technology/amazon-alexa-
new-devices.html [https://perma.cc/BM8B-B9R4]. Kohler took Amazon’s advice to heart,
announcing a version of its Moxie showerhead that includes a removable Alexa-enabled
speaker imbedded right in the showerhead itself. Chris Davies, Kohler Put Alexa in Your
Showerhead and Gave Your Toilet an App, SLASHGEAR (Jan. 3, 2020, 11:48 AM), https://
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the device, Echo Flex, meant for bathrooms, which plugs into wall
outlets.138 Customized, location-specific versions of Alexa are being
sold and deployed in hotel rooms around the country.139
B. Surveying Third-Party Collection
First-party collection is directly tied to third-party collection. A
vast universe of companies purchase intimate data from first-party
collectors.140 Companies also obtain intimate information from
someone who lacks authority to share, disclose, or sell it.141 This
Section provides illustrations.
1. The Data Hand Off: Advertising and Analytics
First-party data collectors routinely allow advertising firms to
collect subscribers’ intimate information for a fee.142 Period-tracking
apps share user data with online advertisers who may further resell
the information.143 For instance, Maya and MIA Fem share data
www.slashgear.com/kohler-put-alexa-in-your-showerhead-and-gave-your-toilet-an-app-
03605166/ [https://perma.cc/7U2X-LKWD].
138. Weise, supra note 137.
139. Chris Welch, Amazon Made a Special Version of Alexa for Hotels with Echo Speakers
in Their Rooms, VERGE (June 19, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/19/17476
688/amazon-alexa-for-hospitality-announced-hotels-echo [https://perma.cc/FW3P-3ULT]. In
2019, to my surprise, I found an Alexa in my hotel room at the Oklahoma City Ambassador
Hotel. A card under the black unassuming device said, “Need something? Just ask Alexa.” It
continued, “Ready for bed? Tell Alexa to play white noise.” The device enabled live connections
to the front desk, room service, and housekeeping. I went to the front desk to complain be-
cause the room did not otherwise have a phone. The attendant explained that I was the first
person to object to the device and that most guests did not mention even noticing it.
140. Shilpa Patel, Dominic Field & Henry Leon, Responsible Marketing with First-Party




143. At least eleven apps sent Facebook intimate information even though some of the app
subscribers were not Facebook members at all and those who used Facebook were not logged
into the site. Daniel Moritz-Rabson, Does Facebook Collect Your ‘Intimate Secrets’ from Apps?
Gov. Andrew Cuomo Orders Investigation, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 22, 2019, 3:58 PM), https://www.
newsweek.com/new-york-governor-directs-investigation-facebook-information-collection-
1341170 [https://perma.cc/H43L-QY9J]. Facebook claimed the apps sharing information with
it violated its terms of service. Apps Send Intimate User Data to Facebook: Report, HINDU
(Feb. 23, 2019, 9:52 PM), https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/apps-send-intimate-
user-data-to-facebook-report/article26352817.ece [https://perma.cc/DPW9-GQPS].
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about subscribers’ contraception and sexual encounters with Face-
book’s advertising system (even if those individuals do not have
Facebook accounts themselves).144 Although the apps and services
explored above (first-party collectors) are marketed to consumers as
“free,” the advertising and analytics ecosystem makes clear that
their price is people’s most intimate information.145
First-party data collectors let firms place trackers on their sites.
For instance, Grindr shared subscribers’ HIV status (noted as “posi-
tive, positive and on HIV treatment, negative, or negative and on
PrEP”) with two companies hired to optimize the app.146 It also
disclosed to advertisers their subscribers’ “precise GPS position,
‘tribe’ (meaning what gay subculture they identify with), sexuality,
relationship status, ethnicity, and phone ID.”147 Some of the infor-
mation shared with advertisers appeared in plain text.148
Third-party trackers are pervasive on porn sites. Researchers
found that 93 percent of the 22,484 porn sites that they analyzed
allowed third parties to collect information about people’s browsing
144. Marie C. Baca, These Apps May Have Told Facebook About the Last Time You Had
Sex, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2019, 3:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2019/09/10/these-apps-may-have-told-facebook-about-last-time-you-had-sex/ [https://perma.cc/
R3DP-U86Q]. For instance, users tried to block tracking by using anonymizing browsers. Id.
145. Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 10, at 626-28.
146. Ghorayshi & Ray, supra note 6. Grindr defended its sharing with the analytics
companies, Apptimize and Localitics, as essential to making the app better. Id. Localytics
describes its services as combining people’s profile data (who they are) and behavioral data
(how they behave online) to personalize mobile advertising. The Stages of Personalization,
UPLAND LOCALYTICS, https://uplandsoftware.com/localytics/resources/ebook/the-stages-of-
personalization/ [https://perma.cc/QCS6-DFE9]. Profile data, the company explains, can
originate from many sources. Id. More than 37,000 apps use the service. Id. In response to bad
press and pushback from subscribers, Grindr announced that it would stop sharing HIV
status information with third parties. Azeen Ghorayshi, Grindr Will Stop Sharing Users’ HIV
Data with Other Companies, BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 2, 2018, 11:03 PM), https://www.buzzfeed
news.com/article/azeenghorayshi/grindr-stopped-sharing-hiv-status [https://perma.cc/89S4-
SNHX].
147. Ghorayshi & Ray, supra note 6. In late 2019, Norwegian researchers found that
Grindr uses various advertising networks and some received information about the type of
relationship users are looking for. ANDREAS CLAESSON & TOR E. BJØRSTAD, NORWEGIAN
CONSUMER COUNCIL, “OUT OF CONTROL”—A REVIEW OF DATA SHARING BY POPULAR MOBILE
APPS 30 (2020), https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/mnemonic-security-
test-report-v1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KX5-P4SM].
148. Ghorayshi & Ray, supra note 6. Grindr’s privacy policy states that if subscribers
“choose to include information in [their] profile[s], and make [their] profile[s] public, that
information will also become public.” Id.
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habits.149 On average, porn sites had seven companies tracking
viewers’ information.150 Google trackers appeared on 74 percent of
the sites studied, Oracle on 24 percent, and Facebook on 10
percent.151 Porn-specific trackers included exoClick, JuicyAds, and
EroAdvertising.152 Another 2019 study found that more than half of
the one hundred most popular porn sites host third-party trackers
that use a technique allowing cookies to be synchronized across
sites.153 Microsoft’s Elena Maris noted that “[t]he fact that the
mechanism for adult site tracking is so similar to, say, online retail
should be a huge red flag.”154
Third-party trackers collected people’s IP addresses, their phones’
advertising identification numbers, and information suggesting
their sexual desires.155 Adult advertising networks collect IP ad-
dresses, browsers, locations, basic computer details, and other
information including how much time people spend viewing certain
videos and the categories of porn they select.156 Forty-five percent of
149. Maris et al., supra note 2, at 2019, 2025.
150. Id. at 2025.
151. Id. After the study was released, Google denied its software was collecting information
to build advertising profiles. James Vincent, Google and Facebook’s Tracking Software Is
Widely Used on Porn Sites, Shows New Study, VERGE (July 18, 2019, 8:01 AM), https://www.
theverge.com/2019/7/18/20699025/porn-browsing-sites-google-facebook-oracle-ad-tracking-
incognito-mode-study [https://perma.cc/H2JU-2F6K]. The company also claimed that “tags for
[their] ad services are never allowed to transmit personally identifiable information.” Id.
152. Maris et al., supra note 2, at 2025.
153. Pelayo Vallina, Álvaro Feal, Julien Gamba, Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez & Antonio
Fernández Anta, Tales from the Porn: A Comprehensive Privacy Analysis of the Web Porn
Ecosystem, PROC. INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONF., Oct. 2019, at 245, 252.
154. Charlie Warzel, Facebook and Google Trackers Are Showing Up on Porn Sites, N.Y.
TIMES (July 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/opinion/google-facebook-sex-
websites.html [https://perma.cc/688Q-KAR2].
155. Id. This is a noted change in practice for the most trafficked porn sites, those owned
by Pornhub. In 2013, Pornhub’s Vice President said that the Pornhub network, including
YouPorn and RedTube, “[did] not allow third parties to access ... users’ activity on the site[s]
or their web histor[ies].” Tracy Clark-Flory, Who’s Tracking Your Porn, SALON (Dec. 12, 2013,
5:00 AM), https://www.salon.com/2013/12/12/whos_tracking_your_porn/ [https://perma.cc/
5KXQ-T2ZW]. Pornhub now has trackers, including adult advertising networks. Dylan
Curran, Browsing Porn in Incognito Mode Isn’t Nearly as Private as You Think, GUARDIAN
(May 27, 2018, 11:33 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/27/incog
nito-mode-what-does-it-mean-history-google-chrome-privacy-settings [https://perma.cc/7A3G-
LBBG].
156. Curran, supra note 155.
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porn site URLs include words or phrases suggesting a particular
sexual preference or interest.157
2. Data Brokers
Data brokers amass and sell dossiers with thousands of data
points on every person, categorizing them based on intimate
information. Their dossiers pair basic information like names,
addresses, employers, and contact information, with far more
sensitive material.158 They detail people’s sexual preferences, porn
consumption, sex toy purchases, escort service usage, and reproduc-
tive choices.159 People are tagged as rape victims, erectile dysfunc-
tion sufferers, sex toy purchasers, AIDS/HIV diagnosed, and gay Air
Force personnel.160
Data brokers sell lists of gay and lesbian adults, rape victims,
people with sexual addictions, individuals with sexually transmitted
diseases, and purchasers of adult material and sex toys.161 Some
data brokers specialize in dating profiles. For instance, USDate sells
dating profiles that include people’s photographs, “usernames, e-
mail addresses, nationality, gender, ... [and] sexual orientation.”162
Exact Data sells customer lists of adult dating service subscribers,
dating and escort services, and “Suddenly Single.”163
The data-broker industry generates two hundred billion dollars
annually.164 People’s personal information is harvested from a vast
157. Maris et al., supra note 2, at 2027.
158. Michal Wlosik, What Is a Data Broker and How Does It Work?, CLEARCODE, https://
clearcode.cc/blog/what-is-data-broker/ [https://perma.cc/XV4H-3QHK].
159. Curran, supra note 155.
160. Wlosik, supra note 158.
161. Jeff Roberts, With Data Brokers Selling Lists of Alcoholics to Big Business, the Feds
Have Some Thinking to Do, GIGAOM (Mar. 13, 2004, 5:00 AM), https://gigaom.com/2014/03/13/
with-data-brokers-selling-lists-of-alcoholics-to-big-business-the-feds-have-some-thinking-to-
do/ [https://perma.cc/KA3N-CDXE].
162. Joana Moll, The Dating Brokers: An Autopsy of Online Love, TACTICAL TECH (Oct.
2018), https://datadating.tacticaltech.org/viz [https://perma.cc/Q5RZ-XGRW]; Samantha Cole,
Shady Data Brokers Are Selling Online Dating Profiles by the Millions, VICE (Nov. 12, 2018,
2:05 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/59vbp5/shady-data-brokers-areselling-online-
dating-profiles-by-the-millions [https://perma.cc/CB6Q-5FYT]; Warzel, supra note 154.
163. See Mailing Lists with “Dating” in the Title, EXACT DATA, https://www.exactdata.com/
mailing-lists.html?keyword=dating [https://perma.cc/F9HR-F86T].
164. Wlosik, supra note 158.
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array of sources, including first-party collectors, government rec-
ords, advertisers, and analytics firms, largely without individuals’
knowledge or assent.165 Thousands of data brokers operate in the
United States.166 Data brokers have personal information on 95
percent of the U.S. population.167
Data brokers say that their dossiers enhance online advertising
and email marketing campaigns.168 They offer their services far
beyond the advertising ecosystem. They serve as “people search
sites” to anyone interested in finding out about specific indi-
viduals.169 They sell risk-mitigation products described as helping
clients prevent fraud that can adversely affect people’s ability to
obtain certain benefits.170 Clients include alternative payment
providers, educational institutions, insurance companies, lenders,
political campaigns, pharmaceutical companies, technology firms,
and real estate services.171 Customers also include government
agencies and law enforcement.172 As Chris Hoofnagle put it years
ago, data brokers serve as “Big Brother’s Little Helpers.”173
165. FED.TRADE COMM’N,DATABROKERS:ACALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
(2014) [hereinafter FTC,DATABROKERS], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/
data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-
2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/K555-J7ML].
166. Wlosik, supra note 158.
167. Kalev Leetaru, The Data Brokers So Powerful Even Facebook Bought Their Data—but
They Got Me Wildly Wrong, FORBES (Apr. 5, 2018, 4:08 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
kalevleetaru/2018/04/05/the-data-brokers-so-powerful-even-facebook-bought-their-data-but-
they-got-me-wildly-wrong/#7d52df5d3107 [https://perma.cc/2J9X-C5VM].
168. Yael Grauer, What Are ‘Data Brokers,’ and Why Are They Scooping Up Information




170. FTC, DATA BROKERS, supra note 165, at viii, 32-33, 48.
171. Id. at 39-40.
172. See David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 62, 65-66 (2013); Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total
Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 263 (2013).
173. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 595 (2003).
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3. Cyber Stalking Apps
As I have explored elsewhere, one infamous “sector of the surveil-
lance economy involves the provision of spyware, a type of malware
installed on someone’s device without knowledge or consent.”174
Cyber stalking apps enable continuous real-time monitoring of
everything phone owners do and say with their devices.175 In real
time, people (often domestic abusers or suspicious partners) can
track a phone owner’s calls, texts, medical appointments, online
searches, porn watching, and minute-to-minute movements.176
Targeted phones can be used as bugging devices, recording conver-
sations within a fifteen-foot radius.177
A selling point of cyber stalking apps is their secretive nature.
App developers assure subscribers that once they download the app
to an unsuspecting person’s phone, the phone owner will not be able
to detect the spyware.178 The goal, as they know well, is the stealth
surveillance of intimate partners or ex-intimate partners.179 Firms
try to conceal this fact by taking innocuous names. For instance, an
app developer changed the name of its app from “GirlFriend Call
Tracker” to “Family Locator,” but the service remains the same.180
The Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Eva Galperin has been watch-
ing the industry closely and she explains that “[t]he people who end
up with this software on their phones can become victims of physical
abuse, of physical stalking. They get beaten. They can be killed.
Their children can be kidnapped.”181
174. Citron, Spying Inc., supra note 7, at 1244.
175. Id. at 1247.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1246.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1247.
180. Laura Hautala, Stalkerware Sees All, and US Laws Haven’t Stopped Its Spread, CNET
(June 5, 2020, 7:10 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/stalkerware-sees-all-and-us-laws-havent-
stopped-its-spread/ [https://perma.cc/WB9G-R9P6].
181. Andy Greenberg, Hacker Eva Galperin Has a Plan to Eradicate Stalkerware, WIRED
(Apr. 3, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/eva-galperin-stalkerware-kaspersky-
antivirus/ [https://perma.cc/5JL7-Q8UZ].
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4. Purveyors of Nonconsensual (Sometimes Fake) Porn 
Invasions of sexual privacy are the business of countless sites.
Many traffic in nonconsensual pornography—sexually explicit
images disclosed without subjects’ consent.182 Sites solicit users to
post people’s nude photos and contact information.183 Some are
devoted to gay men and others to women.184 Sites earn revenue from
online advertising, profiting directly from their trade in human
misery.185
Online hubs hosting nonconsensual pornography are plentiful.
More than three thousand porn sites feature revenge porn as a
genre.186 Sites have also emerged that solicit users to post “deep-
fake” sex videos.187 Much like revenge porn sites, the business model
of these sites is online advertising, and it is lucrative. As the found-
er of the group Battling Against Demeaning & Abusive Selfie
Sharing (BADASS) Katlyn Bowden explains, sites hosting noncon-
sensual pornography have grown crueler in their practices.188
182. See Citron & Franks, supra note 47, at 345-46.
183. Danielle Keats Citron & Woodrow Hartzog, The Decision that Could Finally Kill the
Revenge Porn Business, ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2015/02/the-decision-that-could-finally-kill-the-revenge-porn-business/385113/
[https://perma. cc/KE8N-9SU4].
184. I hesitate to name sites here for fear of giving publicity to destructive sexual-privacy
invasions that they facilitate and encourage.
185. See, e.g., Carolyn A. Uhl, Katlin J. Rhyner, Cheryl A. Terrance & Noël R. Lugo, An
Examination of Nonconsensual Pornography Websites, 28 FEMINISM & PSYCH. 50, 51 (2018).
186. Action Sheet on Revenge Porn, MCALLISTER OLIVARIUS (Jan. 12, 2016),
https://perma.cc/4XVN-PHG7. Even when such sites are taken down, they can reappear. For
example, a notorious revenge porn site reappeared in January 2020 after being shuttered by
Danish authorities in 2018. See Joe Uchill, Someone Is Trying to Revive the Infamous Revenge
Porn Site Anon-IB, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 14, 2020, 8:39 AM), https://www.vice.com/
en/article/pke3j7/someone-is-trying-to-revive-the-infamous-revenge-porn-site-anon-ib
[https://perma.cc/R685-W2XT]. The new site has taken the name and appearance of the old
one, which gained notoriety after hosting the hacked nude photos of female celebrities in 2014.
Id. Within three weeks of the site’s reopening, over 1,500 posters had uploaded or commented
on nude images. Id.
187. Chesney & Citron, supra note 47, at 1758 (2019) (“Deep-fake technology is the cutting-
edge of that trend. It leverages machine-learning algorithms to insert faces and voices into
video and audio recordings of actual people and enables the creation of realistic imper-
sonations out of digital whole cloth. The end result is realistic-looking video or audio making
it appear that someone said or did something. Although deep fakes can be created with the
consent of people being featured, more often they will be created without it.”).
188. Uchill, supra note 186.
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Instead of considering victims’ requests to remove their nude im-
ages, the most popular sites move the images behind a paywall.189
In a variation on this theme, software developers are creating and
selling apps that allow subscribers to upload photographs of women
that then generate fake nude photos. One such app was described
as artificial intelligence software that “ma[de] it easy for anyone to
generate realistic nude images of women simply by feeding the
program a picture of the intended target wearing clothes.”190 The
service charged a flat fee for the premium version.191 Similarly, a
group of programmers claims to have created an app that uses facial
recognition software to cross reference faces in pornography videos
and people’s social media profiles.192 One of the app’s programmers
states that their “goal is to help others check whether their girl-
friends ever acted in those films.”193
II. ASSESSING THE DAMAGE AND LAW’S RESPONSE
The private sector’s vast reservoirs of intimate information
threaten the values and crucial life activities secured by sexual
privacy, inflicting damage to human well-being. This Part takes
stock of the fallout. Then, it explores existing legal protections and
the gaps in the law.
A. Undermining the Values Secured by Sexual Privacy
In prior scholarship, I have explored the crucial life activities and
aspects of human flourishing that sexual privacy makes possible.194
189. Id.
190. James Vincent, New AI Deepfake App Creates Nude Images of Women in Seconds,
VERGE (June 27, 2019, 6:23 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/27/18760896/deepfake-
nude-ai-app-women-deepnude-non-consensual-pornography [https://perma.cc/MJ8X-H3PS].
Some services say that they may use the photos and post them online unless the person pay-
ing for them requests otherwise. See Drew Harwell, A Shadowy AI Service Has Transformed
Thousands of Women’s Photos into Fake Nudes: ‘Make Fantasy a Reality,’ WASH. POST (Oct.
20, 2020, 10:28 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/20/deep-fake-nudes/
[https://perma.cc/KX94-3LGZ].
191. Vincent, supra note 190.
192. Cara Curtis, Creepy Programmer Builds AI Algorithm to ‘Expose’ Adult Actresses,
NEXT WEB (May 29, 2019), https://tnw.to/R7A0f [https://perma.cc/9KMQ-HTNX].
193. Id.
194. See Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 7; Citron, Why Sexual Privacy Matters for
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Here, I will highlight them: self-development, sexual autonomy, and
self-expression; dignity; intimacy; and equality. None alone are why
intimate privacy matters. All are. Indeed, all are essential for hu-
man development, and all are why intimate privacy deserves robust
protection.
Sexual privacy allows people to set the boundaries around their
intimate lives.195 With sexual privacy, people enjoy sexual auton-
omy. They get to decide who learns about their innermost fantasies,
sexual history, and sexual and reproductive health.196 They have the
freedom to go “backstage” to experiment with their bodies, sexuality,
and gender to express themselves as they wish, either alone or with
others who they choose to share that expression.197
The private sector’s handling of intimate data undermines our
ability to decide for ourselves who has access to our intimate lives.
For example, the dating app Jack’d endangered individuals’ choice
to keep their nude photos private by making it easy for strangers to
find them online.198 Grindr negated subscribers’ decision to share
intimate information only with potential partners by giving it to
advertisers and analytics firms.199 There is every reason to believe
that subscribers were distressed (to say the least) by the denial of
their autonomy.200
Private-sector surveillance of intimate information imperils self-
expression and the ability of people to explore new information and
ideas.201 The social conformity theory of chilling effects helps explain
Trust, supra note 47. My book project, tentatively entitled The Privacy Mirage: How Intimacy
Became Data and How to Protect It, will explore the global threat to intimate privacy and
make the case for intimate privacy as a human or civil right deserving robust protection.
195. My prior work explores the value of sexual privacy in great detail. See Citron, Sexual
Privacy, supra note 7, at 1882-93; Citron, Why Sexual Privacy Matters for Trust, supra note
47, at 1193-1203 (exploring the importance of sexual privacy for trust in intimate relation-
ships).
196. Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 7, at 1880, 1882.
197. See id. at 1883-85.
198. Christian Gollayan, Gay Dating App Jack’d Exposed Millions of Nude Photos, N.Y.
POST (Feb. 7, 2019, 4:07 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/02/07/gay-dating-app-jackd-exposed-
millions-of-nude-photos/ [https://perma.cc/4DJV-ZMCV].
199. Julia Belluz, Grindr Is Revealing Its Users’ HIV Status to Third-Party Companies, VOX
(Apr. 3, 2018, 10:26 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/2/17189078/grindr-hiv-status-data-
sharing-privacy [https://perma.cc/EB42-72DJ].
200. See, e.g., Gollayan, supra note 198.
201. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193,
1260 (1998). For a masterful exploration of the importance of intellectual privacy, see NEIL
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why.202 People may refrain from searching, browsing, and express-
ing themselves if their expression and exploration fall outside of
the mainstream.203 Fearing that intimate information may be col-
lected and shared in unwanted ways, people may stop visiting sites
devoted to gender, sexuality, or sexual health. They may not use
period-tracking apps that help them manage anxiety, pain, and
uncertainty.204 They may stop visiting adult sites that enable
“vicarious expression and satisfaction of minority interests that are
difficult, embarrassing, and occasionally illegal to indulge in
reality.”205 They might avoid communicating about intimate matters
for fear of unwanted exposure.206 Self-censorship can be subtle,
though significant, for self-development and self-expression. As
Jonathon Penney explains, we may see this chilling when people
change their modes of engagement and expression from experimen-
tal, nonmainstream ones to more socially conforming, mainstream
ones.207
Public health officials feared this kind of chilling effect after news
broke that Grindr had shared its customers’ HIV status with
analytics firms.208 A Grindr subscriber told BuzzFeed News that he
removed his HIV status from his profile after learning about the
M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE
(2015). Sexual privacy and intellectual privacy are both foundational privacy rights that often
intersect. See id.
202. See Jonathon W. Penney, Understanding Chilling Effects and Their Harms 50-51
(June 2, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Penney, Harms];
Penney, Case Study, supra note 29, at 1; Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, The Impact of
Online Surveillance on Behavior, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 437,
437 (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds., 2017); Elizabeth Stoycheff, Under
Surveillance: Examining Facebook’s Spiral of Silence Effects in the Wake of NSA Internet
Monitoring, JOURNALISM & MASS COMMC’N Q., 2016, at 1, 1-3.
203. Penney, Harms, supra note 202, at 58-62.
204. See Khan, supra note 65.
205. Maris et al., supra note 2, at 2020 (quoting LARRY GROSS, UP FROM INVISIBILITY:
LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE MEDIA IN AMERICA 221 (2001)). See generally Sharif
Mowlabocus, Porn 2.0? Technology, Social Practice, and the New Online Porn Industry, in
PORN.COM: MAKING SENSE OF ONLINE PORNOGRAPHY 69 (Feona Attwood ed., 2010).
206. See Maris et al., supra note 2, at 2019; Marthews & Tucker, supra note 202, at 446-48.
207. Penney, Harms, supra note 202, at 66.
208. Belluz, supra note 199. In response to news that analytics firms obtained people’s HIV
status from dating sites like Grindr, sexual health researcher Dr. Jeffrey Klausner
underscored his “concern[ ] that this would undermine years of efforts to promote people
recording their HIV status in their profile, and sharing their status with others to promote
safer sex.” Id.
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disclosure. He explained that “[s]ome people’s jobs may be in jeop-
ardy if the wrong people find out about their status—or maybe they
have difficult family situations.... It can put people in danger, and
it feels like an invasion of privacy.”209 This example is consistent
with studies showing that victims of nonconsensual pornography
tend to withdraw from online engagement and expression.210
The loss of sexual privacy undermines human dignity by changing
self-perception. When people realize their intimate life is being ob-
served, tracked, and trafficked, they view themselves as “something
seen through another’s eyes.”211 As Anita Allen explains, privacy
invasions risk “form[ing] humiliating, despicable pictures of their
victims that interfere with their victims’ self-concepts and self-
esteem, making them doubt they are the people they have worked
to be.”212 The loss of sexual privacy also undermines dignity by
having others see people as just parts of their intimate lives and not
as fully integrated human beings.213
When people’s nude photos are posted online without consent,
they see themselves as just their genitals or breasts and believe that
others will see them that way. For example, in 2018, a young lawyer
stayed in a hotel for work.214 Without her knowledge or permission,
a hotel employee placed a camera in the bathroom and recorded her
as she showered.215 The employee posted the video and her personal
209. Ghorayshi & Ray, supra note 6.
210. See generally CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 23; Danielle Keats
Citron, Civil Rights in Our Information Age, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY,
AND REPUTATION 31, 31 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010); Danielle Keats
Citron & Jonathon W. Penney, When Law Frees Us to Speak, 87 FORDHAM L.REV. 2317, 2327-
32 (2019); Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for Digital Expression
(You Won’t Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1365 (2018) (“[N]ot everyone can freely
engage online. This is especially true for women, minorities, and political dissenters who are
more often the targets of cyber mobs and individual harassers.”); Citron & Franks, supra note
47, at 385; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 40, at 106.
211. Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 223, 227 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984)
(emphasis added).
212. ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 15 (2011).
213. See Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 7, at 1882-84.
214. Phone Interview with Joan (Oct. 15, 2018); Interview with Joan (May 3, 2019). I will
explore the invasion of Joan’s sexual privacy in greater detail in my book project. See supra
note 194.
215. Interview with Joan (Oct. 15, 2018), supra note 214.
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details on various porn sites.216 The woman told me that after find-
ing out about the postings, she despaired at seeing herself and at
being seen as just a naked body relieving and washing herself.217
Private-sector handling of intimate information can jeopardize
the trust that is essential for the development of intimate relation-
ships. As Charles Fried argued years ago, privacy is the “oxygen” for
intimacy.218 Intimacy develops as partners share vulnerable aspects
of themselves.219 Partners must believe that their confidences will
be kept not only by their partners but also by the firms handling
their intimate information. If people lose faith in the companies
facilitating their intimate interactions, then they may stop using
their services, to the detriment of the project of intimacy. The loss
of trust is especially profound when sites disclose people’s nude
images without consent. People stop dating for fear that future part-
ners will frequent porn sites and revenge porn sites to post their
nude photos in violation of their trust and confidence.220
Equal opportunity is on the line as well. The surveillance of
intimate life will be particularly costly to women, sexual minorities,
and nonwhite people. The damage stems from demeaning gender,
racial, and homophobic stereotypes and the social construction of
sexuality.221 When heterosexual men appear in videos having sex or
are designated as users of sex toys, they may even be socially em-
powered by the performance or activity whereas women, racial
minorities, and LGBTQ individuals are stigmatized, marginalized,
and disempowered.222 Women, sexual minorities, and nonwhites are
marked by stereotypes and other social forces that reconstruct them
“as devian[t] and inferior[ ]” and “confine them to a nature which is
often attached in some way to their bodies, and which thus cannot
easily be denied.”223 Martha Nussbaum explains that “a universal
216. Id. The perpetrator sent a video of her showering to her LinkedIn contacts. Id.
217. Id.
218. See Fried, supra note 24, at 477-78.
219. See id. at 484; Citron, Why Sexual Privacy Matters for Trust, supra note 47, at 1200-
01.
220. Citron, Why Sexual Privacy Matters for Trust, supra note 47, at 1209. When domestic
violence victims learn that they are being tracked on their cellphones, they may fear pur-
chasing new phones lest abusers install a cyber stalking app again.
221. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBER SPACE, supra note 23, at 14-15.
222. See id; Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 7, at 1908, 1919-20, 1928.
223. IRISMARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 59 (1990). Stereotypes
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human discomfort with bodily reality” often works to undermine
women, sexual minorities, and nonwhite people as disgusting and
pathological.224 As Kimberlé Crenshaw’s “intersectionality” frame-
work shows, the forces that marginalize individuals tend to operate
on multiple levels, often compounding the harm suffered.225
Consider the disproportionate impact of sites trafficking in non-
consensual pornography. A majority of the nude images posted
online without consent involve women and sexual minorities.226
Thus, nonconsensual porn impacts women and girls far more fre-
quently than men and boys.227 Individuals who identify as sexual
minorities are more likely than heterosexual individuals to experi-
ence threats of, or actual, nonconsensual pornography.228 As Ari
Waldman has found, gay and bisexual male users of geosocial dat-
ing apps are more frequently victims of nonconsensual pornography
than both the general population and the broader lesbian, gay, and
bisexual communities.229
We see the disproportionate impact on women featured on deep
fake sex video sites. According to a 2019 study, 96 percent of all of
the nearly fifteen thousand deep fake videos online are deep fake
often place women, sexual minorities, and nonwhite people into an experience of “double
consciousness” so that information is inevitably interpreted to their disadvantage. See id. at
60. For instance, if information suggests that a woman is sexually active, then she will be
viewed as a slut; if information suggests that a woman is sexually inactive, then she will be
viewed as frigid, manhater, or a lesbian. See id. at 59-60.
224. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at xv (2010).
225. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1991).
226. ASIA A. EATON, HOLLY JACOBS & YANET RUVALCABA, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, 2017
NATIONWIDE ONLINE STUDY OF NONCONSENSUAL PORN VICTIMIZATION AND PERPETRATION: A
SUMMARY REPORT 12 (2017), https://www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/
CCRI-2017-Research-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL6C-AQ6U]. For other studies confirming
this finding, see Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 7, at 1919 n.307.
227. See EATON ET AL., supra note 226, at 12.
228. See Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 7, at 1919-20 (discussing various studies
confirming this finding); Ari Ezra Waldman, Law, Privacy, and Online Dating: “Revenge Porn”
in Gay Online Communities, 44 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 987, 987 (2019) (“According to the Data
& Society Research Institute, 15 percent of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) Internet users
report that someone has threatened to share their explicit images; 7 percent say someone has
actually done it.” (citing AMANDA LENHART, MICHELLE YBARRA & MYESHIA PRICE-FEENEY,
DATA & SOC. RSCH. INST., NONCONSENSUAL IMAGE SHARING: ONE IN 25 AMERICANS HAS BEEN
A VICTIM OF ‘REVENGE PORN’ (2016))).
229. Waldman, supra note 228, at 988.
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sex videos and 99 percent of those videos involve inserting women’s
faces into porn without consent.230 In the past year, the number of
deep fake sex videos has grown exponentially as has deep fake sex
videos featuring women without consent.231
Consider the potential risks to women as a result of femtech
services.232 According to media reports, some employers and health
insurers have access to employees’ period- and fertility-tracking
apps.233 Women’s intimate information could be used to raise the
cost of employer-provided health insurance, adjust wages, or scale
back employment benefits.234 It could affect the ability to obtain life
insurance, keep jobs, and get promotions. Medical researcher Paula
Castaño explains that the information tracked by fertility apps
raises concerns because it offers little insight as a clinical matter
and instead “focus[es] on variables that affect time out of work and
insurance utilization.”235
If intimate information is shared with data brokers, it could be
used in the actuarial scoring of women, sexual minorities, and non-
white people to their detriment. As the Federal Trade Commission
explains, data brokers’ scoring processes are not transparent, which
“means that consumers are unable to take actions that might
mitigate the negative effects of lower scores, such as being limited
230. HENRY AJDER, GIORGIO PATRINI, FRANCESCO CAVALLI & LAURENCE CULLEN,
DEEPTRACE, THE STATE OF DEEPFAKES: LANDSCAPE, THREATS, AND IMPACT 1-2 (2019),
https://regmedia.co.uk/2019/10/08/deepfake_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P8K-J62S]. Eight
of the top ten pornography websites host deepfake pornography, and there are nine deepfake
pornography websites hosting 13,254 fake porn videos (mostly featuring female celebrities
without their consent). Id. at 6. These sites generate income from advertising. Id. Indeed, as
the first comprehensive study of deepfake video and audio explains, “[D]eepfake pornography
could represent a growing business opportunity, with all these websites featuring some form
of advertising.” Id. See generally Chesney & Citron, supra note 47, at 1758.
231. Zoom Interview with Henry Ajder, Head of Commc’ns & Rsch., Deeptrace (now
Sensity).
232. As discussed above, this is a direct result of the work of femtech companies. See supra
notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
233. Harwell, supra note 9.
234. Id. The video game company Activision Blizzard pays employees a dollar a day to give
it access to the data that they generate with a pregnancy-tracking app provided by Ovia
Health. Id. The company uses a special version of the app that relays health data in de-
identified form to the employer’s internal website accessible by human resources personnel.
Id. Ovia Health contends that intimate information can help employers cut back on medical
costs and help usher women back to work after birth. Id.
235. Id.
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to ads for subprime credit or receiving different levels of service
from companies.”236 Moreover, insurance companies can potentially
use scoring processes to infer that individuals are “higher risk.”237
Finally, scoring processes could negatively impact the interest rates
charged on loans.238 News about the disproportionately higher
creditworthiness of men as compared to women for Apple’s new
credit card demonstrates the point.239
Reservoirs of intimate information shared with advertisers and
sold to data brokers make their way into the hands of vendors who
use that data to train algorithms used in hiring, housing, insurance,
and other crucial decisions.240 As more intimate information is
collected, used, and shared, it will increasingly be used to entrench
bias. People’s sexual assaults, abortions, painful periods, HIV
infections, escort use, extramarital affairs, and porn preferences
may be used to train job-recruitment and housing-matching algo-
rithms.241 A wealth of scholarship and research explores the discrim-
inatory impacts of algorithmic discrimination in the commercial
sector.242 A prevailing concern is that algorithmic tools “replicate
236. FTC, DATA BROKERS, supra note 165, at 48.
237. Id.
238. Rosato, supra note 60.
239. E.g., Neil Vigdor, Apple Card Investigated After Gender Discrimination Complaints,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2CuelOT [https://perma.cc/DVX5-ERCE].
240. EPIC AI Rulemaking Petition, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/ftc/ai/
epic-ai-rulemaking-petition/#legal [https://perma.cc/AW4S-ZB3U]. See generally Danielle
Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions,
89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (2014). 
241. See, e.g., Complaint and Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief, ELEC.
PRIV.INFO.CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/ftc/airbnb/EPIC_FTC_Airbnb_Complaint_Feb2020.
pdf [https://perma.cc/F3XE-CWX9]. EPIC raised concerns about Airbnb’s deployment of a “risk
assessment” tool that assigns secret ratings to prospective renters based on behavioral traits
using an opaque proprietary algorithm that is trained on personal information obtained from
third parties. Id. at 5. The complaint noted that Airbnb’s machine learning inputs include
personal data collected from “web pages, information from databases, posts on the person’s
social network account,” and other information. Id. Moreover, “Airbnb’s algorithm claims to
identify ‘negative traits’ including whether the individual ... is involved in sex work, ... is
involved in pornography ... , or has interests that indicate negative personality or behavior
traits.” Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 9,070,088 col. 2 l. 7-15 (filed June 30, 2015)).
242. Solon Barocas, Kate Crawford, Deborah Hellman, Anna Lauren Hoffman, Ifeoma
Injuwa, Pauline Kim, Jason Schultz, Andrew Selbst, and Meredith Whittaker have been doing
pathbreaking work in this area. See, e.g., CAROLINE CRIADO PEREZ, INVISIBLE WOMEN: DATA
BIAS IN A WORLD DESIGNED FOR MEN (2019); Anna Lauren Hoffmann, Data Violence and How
Bad Engineering Choices Can Damage Society, MEDIUM (Apr. 30, 2018), https://medium.com/s/
story/data-violence-and-how-bad-engineering-choices-can-damage-society-39e44150e1d4
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historical hierarchies by rendering people along a continuum of
least to most ‘valuable.’”243
The opacity of commercial algorithms makes identifying and
challenging discrimination difficult.244 But examples do exist.
Consider, for example, Amazon’s experimental hiring tool that
ranked job candidates by learning from data about the company’s
past practices. A Reuters story revealed that the hiring algorithm
“downgraded” resumes from candidates who attended two women’s
colleges along with any resume that included the word “women’s.”245
Amazon abandoned the tool when it could not ensure that it was not
free of bias against women.246
B. Surveying the Damage
The widespread collection, storage, use, and disclosure of intimate
information risks emotional, physical, and reputational harm. It
makes people vulnerable to manipulation, blackmail, and
[https://perma.cc/C4JE-HYS7]; Inioluwa Deborah Raji & Joy Buolamwini, Actionable
Auditing: Investigating the Impact of Publicly Naming Biased Performance Results of
Commercial AI Products, PROC. CONF. ON A.I., ETHICS, & SOC’Y, Jan. 2019, at 429; Allyson E.
Gold, Redliking: When Redlining Goes Online, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1841 (2021).
243. WEST ET AL., supra note 34, at 10; see also Jevan Hutson, Jessie G. Taft, Solon Barocas
& Karen Levy, Debiasing Desire: Addressing Bias & Discrimination on Intimate Platforms,
2 PROC. ASS’N COMPUTING MACH. HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION, Nov. 2018, at 2, 4-8; Sasha
Costanza-Chock, Design Justice, A.I., and Escape from the Matrix of Domination, J. DESIGN
& SCI. (July 16, 2018), https://jods.mitpress.mit.edu/pub/costanza-chock [https://perma.cc/
MEN5-2438]; Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June
25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-
guy-problem.html [https://perma.cc/PP7V-RFJP].
244. See, e.g., In re HireVue, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/ftc/hirevue/
[https://perma.cc/Z5R4-RXHK] (arguing that “hiring algorithms are more likely to be biased
by default” and that HireVue keeps secret “the training data, factors, logic, or techniques used
to generate each algorithmic assessment”). Indeed, career staff in the offices of state attorneys
general have told me that the most challenging problem is figuring out which of the countless
vendors to target with civil investigative demands and the likelihood that those demands will
be met by claims of trade secrecy.
245. Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against
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extortion.247 The examples of suffering are as plentiful as they are
disturbing.
Consider the aftermath of the hack of Ashley Madison for John
Gibson, a married father and Baptist minister who was one of many
exposed in the hack. He committed suicide days after the public
learned about the hack.248 Gibson’s wife explained that her hus-
band’s suicide note described his deep shame at having his name on
the site: “We all have things that we struggle with, but it wasn’t so
bad that we wouldn’t have forgiven it.... But for John, it carried such
a shame, and he just couldn’t see that.”249 Gibson’s daughter
likewise concluded that at least “part of the reason ... he killed
himself [was] because he wasn’t willing to share his shame with [his
family].”250 Gibson’s wife believed that he was “worried about losing
his job.”251 In disputing rumors that Gibson was fired, however, his
daughter explained that he resigned after the church learned about
the exposure of his information in the hack.252 Gibson’s fear about
losing his job was well-founded. Victims of sexual-privacy invasions
have been fired or encountered great difficulty obtaining work.253
Stories abound of scammers using emails and passwords hacked
from porn sites to blackmail people. Criminals write to individuals
claiming they recorded them watching porn online and demanding
money to keep the videos secret. Over a seven-month stretch in
2018, victims lost $332,000 to these scams.254 More than 89,000
247. For a superb discussion of such risks for governmental and private sector collection
of personal data, see Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934,
1953-54 (2013).
248. Broder Van Dyke, supra note 112. Gibson’s was not the only suicide related to the
Ashley Madison hack. Two people in Canada killed themselves in the wake of the leak. Chris
Baraniuk, Ashley Madison: ‘Suicides’ Over Website Hack, BBC (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.
bbc.com/news/technology-34044506 [https://perma.cc/ATH5-4D4B].
249. Broder Van Dyke, supra note 112.
250. Jon Ronson, The Yes Ladder, THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT, at 19:10 (Nov. 3, 2017), https://
www.stitcher.com/show/the-butterfly-effect-with-jon-ronson/episode/the-butterfly-effect-ep-5-
the-yes-ladder-52105431 [https://perma.cc/UZS6-MVBP].
251. Broder Van Dyke, supra note 112.
252. Ronson, supra note 250, at 12:26.
253. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 23, at 193; see, e.g., Complaint for
Permanent Injunction & Other Equitable Relief at 14, FTC v. EMP Media, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-
00035-APG-NJK, 2018 WL 372707 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2018) (explaining that victims of
nonconsensual pornography “have lost their jobs—or are concerned that they might be fired
from a current job”).
254. Isobel Asher Hamilton, Criminal Groups Are Offering $360,000 Salaries to
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people were targeted, and on average they paid $540.255 Increas-
ingly, criminals are targeting high-earning victims, including
company executives, doctors, and lawyers.256
The national security implications of this kind of activity are sig-
nificant. The concentration of sensitive information on dating sites
presents an inviting target for governments seeking leverage over
political activists, dissidents, or foreign agents.257 National security
experts raised these concerns after the Chinese government bought
the gay dating app Grindr.258 Peter Mattis, a former U.S. govern-
ment analyst and China specialist, remarked:
What you can see from Chinese intelligence practices is a clear
effort to collect a lot of personal information on a lot of different
people, and to build a database of names that’s potentially useful
either for influence or for intelligence.... Then later, when the
party-state comes into contact with someone in the database,
there’s now information to be pulled.259
Criminals and hostile states are not the only ones who exploit
intimate information to serve their own ends at the expense of ours.
When companies use people’s acute emotional fragility or member-
ship in a protected class to override their wishes, their actions can
Accomplices Who Can Help Them Scam CEOs About Their Porn-Watching Habits, BUS.




257. “Tinder is the fourth dating app in the nation to be forced to comply with the Russian
government’s request for user data, Moscow Times reports, and it’s among 175 services that
have already consented to share information with the nation’s Federal Security Service,
according to a registry online.” Melanie Ehrenkranz, The Russian Government Now Requires
Tinder to Hand Over People’s Sexts, GIZMODO (June 3, 2019, 12:05 PM), https://gizmodo.com/
the-russian-government-now-requires-tinder-to-hand-over-1835201563 [https://perma.cc/
58PA-AQ7U]. In response to these reports a Tinder spokesperson asserted that “this regis-
tration in no way shares any user or personal data with any Russian regulatory bodies and
we have not handed over any data to their government.” Id.
258. Steven Blum, What Does a Chinese Company Want with Gay Hookup App Grindr?,
L.A. MAG. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.lamag.com/citythinkblog/grindr-china-fbi/ [https://
perma.cc/N5JM-THH5].
259. Josh Rogin, Can the Chinese Government Now Get Access to Your Grindr Profile?,
WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/
2018/01/12/can-the-chinese-government-now-get-access-to-your-grindr-profile/ [https://perma.
cc/3X82-A6LE].
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be viewed as “dark patterns.”260 “The Spinner” exemplifies the
troubling nature of dark patterns. It promises to bend the will of
people’s intimate partners with its advertising services.261 The
online service sends innocent-looking links to people via text that,
when clicked, create cookies that send targeted advertisements.262
The company claims to have swayed people to get back together
with lovers, to initiate sex, and to settle their divorces.263 The
company’s most requested service is its “Initiate Sex” feature, which
sends ads trumpeting reasons why people should initiate sex.264
Another illustration of troubling manipulation is the period-
tracking app FEMM, which uses subscribers’ intimate information
to dissuade them from terminating their pregnancies.265 An anti-
abortion group runs the app, but it does not disclose that to sub-
scribers.266 The app’s marketing materials simply say:
Are you looking to track your menstrual cycles and symptoms,
get pregnant or avoid pregnancy? The FEMM app is more than
just a period tracker: it provides you with cutting edge science
that helps you keep track of your health, understand what is
going on with your body, flag potential issues and connect with
260. STIGLER COMM. ON DIGIT. PLATFORMS, supra note 15, at 240-41. As the Stigler report
notes, using personal data to manipulate people can be benign, such as by serving them ads
for restaurants around lunchtime. Id. Yet the practice is morally and legally troubling when
companies use sensitive data to exploit and manipulate people. Id. The Stigler report invokes
the concept of dark patterns to evaluate user-interface systems that nudge people to disclose
information that they otherwise would not disclose if they had time to consider the impli-
cations. Id. Such systems might not be understood as deceptive under traditional under-
standing of consumer protection laws. Id. at 249.
261. Parmy Olson, For $29, This Man Will Help Manipulate Your Loved Ones with
Targeted Facebook and Browser Links, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2019, 7:20 AM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/parmyolson/2019/01/15/a-shadowy-entrepreneur-claims-his-online-manipulation-
business-is-thriving/#6176936572a9 [https://perma.cc/3NNN-CN5D].
262. Id.; Fiona Tapp, New Service Promises to Manipulate Your Wife into Having Sex with
You, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 18, 2018, 11:38 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-
features/spinner-service-manipulate-wife-sex-712385/ [https://perma.cc/X2D9-UY55].
263. Kevin Poulsen, For $29, This Company Swears It Will ‘Brainwash’ Someone on
Facebook, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 22, 2019, 10:07 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/for-dollar29-
this-company-swears-it-will-brainwash-someone-on-facebook [https://perma.cc/3RBW-5N8L].
264. Id.
265. Jessica Glenza, Revealed: Women’s Fertility App Is Funded by Anti-Abortion Cam-
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a network of doctors and nurses to provide you the best health
care. We’re a new revolution in women’s health!267
The app provides materials claiming that birth control is unsafe and
highlighting information that promotes pregnancy.268 The app mis-
leads subscribers about its motives and propagates misinforma-
tion.269
C. Understanding the Legal Landscape
In the United States, information privacy law does little to curtail
the private sector’s amassing of vast amounts of intimate informa-
tion, at least outside of the provision of health care.270 It generally
presumes the propriety of commercial collection of personal data.271
As William McGeveran explains in his influential privacy casebook,
American law treats the processing of personal data as both inev-
itable and prosocial.272
1. Privacy Legislation
American privacy law generally does not curtail data collection.273
Instead, it focuses on procedural protections, such as ensuring the
transparency of corporate data practices (referred to as notice) and
267. FEMM Health Period and Ovulation Tracker, GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/
store/apps/details?id=org.femmhealth.femm&hl=en_US [https://perma.cc/LNA2-NCRU].
268. See Glenza, supra note 265.
269. See id.
270. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998 is the rare exception.
It limits the collection of children’s online information to instances in which parents have
explicitly provided consent. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 § 1303(a), 15
U.S.C. § 6502. Similarly, in the European Union, the GDPR protects information pertaining
to individuals’ “sex life” as sensitive information, precluding its collection except upon explicit
consent. GDPR, supra note 103, at 38.
271. Citron, A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy, supra note 8, at 1141.
272. See WILLIAMMCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATAPROTECTION LAW 382-83 (2016); Citron,
Reservoirs of Danger, supra note 44, at 245.
273. Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 747, 771 (2016) [hereinafter Citron, Privacy Policymaking]. Some states limit
commercial contexts in which Social Security numbers and zip codes can be collected. See, e.g.,
CAL.CIV.CODE § 1798.85 (West 2015) (Social Security numbers); TEX.BUS.&COM.CODE ANN.
§ 505.003 (West 2009) (zip codes).
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securing certain rights over personal data (referred to as choice).274
Even its more reform-oriented elements continue this trend. For
example, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), enacted in
2018, gives consumers the right to know what personal information
has been collected and to opt-out of its sale.275
So long as companies post privacy policies and offer opt-out rights
under state law,276 they can largely collect, use, and sell intimate
information without limitation.277 It should therefore not be a sur-
prise that Grindr’s privacy policy warns that its advertising
partners may “also collect information directly from you.”278 The
femtech market is doing the same. A recent study showed that ten
popular fertility-tracking apps including Clue sold subscribers’
personal information to at least 135 companies.279 Individuals
should not be reassured if companies pledge to de-identify intimate
information before selling it given the ease of re-identification.280 As
274. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2014); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100
(West 2020). State attorneys general played an important role in getting legislation passed
to require privacy policies. Citron, Privacy Policymaking, supra note 273, at 764-65.
275. See California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-.198. Under the
CCPA, websites must detail the categories of personal information that they collect and the
categories of third parties with whom that information may be shared. Id. On the CCPA
generally and its comparison to GDPR, see Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William
McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1733 (2021).
276. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120. Of course, compliance with notice requirements is not
perfect. For instance, according to researchers, only 11 percent of the privacy policies posted
by porn sites disclose that third-party trackers may be collecting visitors’ information. Maris
et al., supra note 2, at 2027. Many consumers will not invoke their opt-out rights due to the
stickiness of defaults and the sheer number of companies that would need to be contacted to
make a dent in the effort to reduce the trafficking of one’s personal information. See generally
WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT (2018).
277. See Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the
Limits of Data Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1723 (2020). Indeed, a long-standing critique
of the fair information practice principles is that they enable data collection to proceed
unencumbered for the sake of efficiency. JAMES RULE, DOUGLAS MCADAM, LINDA STEARNS &
DAVID UGLOW, THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 93 (1980).
278. Thomas Germain, Popular Apps Share Intimate Details About You with Dozens of
Companies, CONSUMER REPS. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/
popular-apps-share-intimate-details-about-you/ [https://perma.cc/NN9D-DRU9].
279. Rosato, supra note 60.
280. Dániel Kondor, Behrooz Hashemian, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye & Carlo Ratti,
Towards Matching User Mobility Traces in Large-Scale Datasets, IEEETRANSACTIONS ON BIG
DATA, Sept. 24, 2018, at 1, 10.
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Julie Cohen has underscored, American informational capitalism is
built on the edifice of this legal structure.281
Under federal and state law, companies must store intimate
information in a reasonably secure manner. Legal obligations stem
from data security,282 data disposal,283 encryption,284 breach notifi-
cation,285 and unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAP)
laws.286 Companies may have a duty to adopt certain data security
practices, such as having a comprehensive data-security program
addressing potential risks to consumers.287 As explored below,
companies have faced suit for inadequately securing intimate
information.
One might assume that privacy law limits all of the private
sector’s collection of intimate information related to health condi-
tions. The crucial protections of the federal Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),288 however, only cover
data collected during the provision of health care and not health
data generally. HIPAA is a health care portability law with privacy
protections, not a health privacy bill.289 It covers particular health-
care providers (known as covered entities), such as medical
practices, hospitals, and health insurance companies.290 HIPAA, for
281. Cohen, supra note 43, at 11 (“Data harvesting and processing are one of the principal
business models of informational capitalism, so there is little motivation either to devise more
effective methods of privacy regulation or to implement existing methods more rigorously.”).
282. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (West 2020); 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01(1)
(LexisNexis 2020).
283. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-471 (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93I,
§ 2 (West 2008).
284. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.85(a)(3).
285. See, e.g., id. § 1798.82.
286. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110a to -110q.
287. William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1135, 1140, 1176-
1180 (2019).
288. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 194-191, 110
Stat. 1936.
289. Id. (describing HIPAA as a law that Congress enacted “to improve portability and
continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual markets, to combat waste,
fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to promote the use of medical
savings accounts, to improve access to long-term care services and coverage, to simplify the
administration of health insurance, and for other purposes”).
290. When it enacted HIPAA in 1996, Congress delegated authority to the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) to enact national data privacy or confidentiality and data
security standards. ALLEN, supra note 212, at 113-14. HHS issued its Standards for Privacy
of Individually Identifiable Health Information in 2000, which is commonly known as the
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instance, requires that covered entities obtain consent before using
or disclosing individually identifiable “protected health informa-
tion.”291 That provision does not apply to the broad array of non-
covered entities, including femtech apps, search engines, medical
information sites, or dating sites.292 When a dating app collects
people’s HIV status or when a femtech app amasses the dates of
abortions and miscarriages, it is not constrained by HIPAA’s obli-
gations around explicit consent.293
2. Privacy Policy Making of Law Enforcers
In the rare case, the Federal Trade Commission and state
attorneys general have set norms around the collection and storage
of intimate information.294 Federal and state UDAP laws provide
support for this activity.295 The following examples provide precedent
HIPAA Privacy Rule. OFF. FOR C.R., DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OCR PRIVACY BRIEF:
SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1-2, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
privacy/laws-regulations/index.html [https://perma.cc/5FUP-CWXT]. The HIPAA Privacy Rule
applies only to covered entities—healthcare providers who engage in certain electronic
healthcare transactions, health plans, and healthcare clearinghouses like hospital billing
providers and insurers. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102-103 (2019).
291. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a).
292. See id. §§ 160.102-03. Period-tracking app Ovia claims to comply with HIPAA, surely
due to the fact that the company shares de-identified data with employers who provide health
insurance to employees. Harwell, supra note 9.
293. In FAA v. Cooper, the Supreme Court considered whether the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration’s disclosure of a pilot’s HIV status to another federal agency without consent vio-
lated the Privacy Act of 1974. 566 U.S. 284, 289 (2012). The Court found that the plaintiff ’s
emotional distress did not amount to “actual damages”—which would require proof of eco-
nomic harm. Id. at 302.
294. Citron, Privacy Policymaking, supra note 273, at 773-75. The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau also has the authority to regulate abusive conduct, at least within the
banking and financial services sector. See 12 U.S.C. § 5531. Under 12 U.S.C. § 5531, an
abusive practice is one that “materially interferes with the ability of ... consumer[s] to
understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service or ... takes
unreasonable advantage of” their lack of understanding of such a service or product’s
“material risks” or of their inability to protect their interests. Id. § 5531(d).
295. The Federal Trade Commission has enforcement authority to police unfair and
deceptive commercial acts and practices under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45. In the 1970s, state lawmakers followed the
federal government’s lead in adopting so-called baby section 5 acts, that is, UDAP laws. See
Citron, Privacy Policymaking, supra note 273, at 754. With this authority, state attorneys
general have served as crucial privacy norm entrepreneurs using their authority under state
UDAP laws. Id. at 763-78. I had the great fortune of witnessing creative state attorney gen-
eral privacy policy making in advising then-California AG Kamala Harris from 2014 to 2016.
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for entities handling intimate information in the relevant jurisdic-
tions.
The Massachusetts Attorney General’s office has considered the
collection of information about women’s visits to abortion clinics,
inferred from geolocation data, to constitute an unfair and deceptive
business practice.296 In 2015, an advertising company in Brookline,
Massachusetts, was hired to bombard “abortion-minded women”
with pro-life advertisements as they visited certain health provid-
ers.297 Geofencing technology was key to the effort. It let the adver-
tising company target women’s cell phones as they entered “Planned
Parenthood clinic[s], hospitals, [and] doctor’s offices that perform
abortions.”298 Women saw ads entitled “Pregnancy Help,” “You Have
Choices,” and “You’re Not Alone” that linked to live web chats with
a “pregnancy support specialist.”299 Once an individual’s device had
been tagged, then that person would continue to see pro-life ads for
the next thirty days.300
The Massachusetts Attorney General’s office viewed the com-
pany’s collection of location data to infer women’s pregnancies as
constituting an unfair and deceptive business practice.301 The
Id. at 773 n.174.
296. Assurance of Discontinuance at 4-5, In re Copley Advertising, LLC, No. 1784CV01033
(Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2017).
297. Id. at 3.
298. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Naquanna Comeaux, Target Marketing to
Reach Clients ... in a Planned Parenthood Waiting Room, PREGNANCY HELP NEWS (July 22,
2015), https://pregnancyhelpnews.com/target-marketing-to-reach-clients-in-a-planned-parent
hood-waiting-room [https://perma.cc/83EC-JXZ7]).
299. Id. at 3-4 (quoting Comeaux, supra note 298).
300. Id. at 4.
301. Id. at 4-5. In a series of consent decrees, the FTC has made clear that it considers
geolocation information as sensitive information requiring explicit, opt-in consent before
collecting it. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order Settling
Charges Against Flashlight App Creator (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2014/04/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-against-flashlight-app
[http://perma.cc/NA4X-5VRN]. For a discussion of the norms around collection of geolocation
data, see Danielle Keats Citron, BEWARE: The Dangers of Location Data, FORBES (Dec. 24,
2014, 3:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/12/24/beware-the-dangers-of-
location-data/#6037ba1543cb [https://perma.cc/5JGB-WHHG]. The U.S. Supreme Court has
held that obtaining cell-site location data from third parties constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217-18 (2018) (finding that
location data “hold[s] for many Americans the ‘privacies of life’” and that a government with
access to historic location data “achieves near perfect surveillance” (quoting Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014))); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404
(2011). I have been advising federal lawmakers on efforts to provide stronger regulatory
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Massachusetts AG argued that the firm’s practice violated state law
“because it intrude[d] upon a consumer’s private health or medical
affairs or status [or it] result[ed] in the gathering or dissemination
of private health or medical facts about the consumer without his or
her knowledge or consent.”302
The advertising company and the AG’s office entered into a settle-
ment agreement under which the company vowed not to use geo-
fencing technology near medical centers or physician offices to infer
people’s “health status, medical condition, or medical treatment.”303
Although the agreement is enforceable only against this specific
advertising company (one of the limits of governance by settlement
agreements), it established a norm against the collection of
geolocation data to infer consumers’ reproductive health data under
Massachusetts law.304
In another effort to curtail the collection of intimate data, the
FTC brought a regulatory action against mobile spyware company
Retina-X under its UDAP authority in section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.305 The complaint alleged that the defen-
dant’s spyware injured consumers by enabling stalkers to monitor
people’s physical movements, sensitive information, and online
activities without consent.306 The unwanted collection of cellphone
activity risked exposing victims to emotional distress, financial
losses, and physical harm, including death.307 The FTC charged that
protections for location data. This effort is not new. In 2014, then-Senator Al Franken
proposed the federal Location Privacy Protection Act, but the bill failed to pick up traction.
See Citron, Spying Inc., supra note 7, at 1274.
302. See Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 296, at 4-5.
303. Id. at 7.
304. See Citron, Privacy Policymaking, supra note 273, at 785; Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow
Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 620-25
(2014).
305. See Complaint, In re Retina-X Studios, LLC, No. C-4711 (F.T.C. Oct. 22, 2019). Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits unfair and deceptive acts and practices.
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45. It has served as the template for state
UDAP laws, which are often referred to as mini-FTC Acts. See CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L
CONSUMER L.CTR.,CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES:A50-STATEREPORT ON UNFAIR AND
DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 5-6 (2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/
pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/89MT-WQGZ]; Lydia F de la Torre, FTC
Privacy and Cyber-Security Authority Under the FTC Act, MEDIUM (Jun. 15, 2019),
https://medium.com/golden-data/the-ftc-act-4b7bde468e5f [https://perma.cc/HW3G-SYM9].
306. See Complaint, supra note 305, at 3.
307. Id.
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the mobile spyware constituted an unfair practice because consum-
ers could not reasonably avoid the secret spying and the harm was
not outweighed by the countervailing benefits.308 In 2020, the FTC
entered into a consent decree with Retina-X. The defendant agreed
to obtain express written agreement from purchasers that they
would use the product only for legitimate and lawful purposes.309
Regrettably, the defendant was not required to refrain from selling
monitoring products in the future,310 a result that shows another
limit of governance by consent decree.
State and federal enforcement efforts have set important pre-
cedent regarding sites amassing people’s nude images as part of
extortion schemes. In her capacity as California’s Attorney General,
Kamala Harris “prosecuted operators of sites that encouraged users
to post nude photos and [then] charged for their removal.”311 In one
case, site operator Kevin Bollaert faced charges of extortion, con-
spiracy, and identity theft after urging users to post ex-lovers’ nude
photos and offering to remove those images for hundreds of
dollars.312 Bollaert was convicted of twenty-seven felony counts and
sentenced to eight years of imprisonment and ten years of manda-
tory supervision.313
The FTC sued another revenge porn operator under section 5 of
the FTC Act for exploiting nude images shared in confidence for
commercial gain.314 The operator agreed to shutter the site and
delete the images.315 The FTC joined forces with the Nevada
308. Id. at 7.
309. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Gives Final Approval to Settlement with
Stalking Apps Developer (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2020/03/ftc-gives-final-approval-settlement-stalking-apps-developer [https://perma.cc/URN6-
A5AA].
310. See Complaint, supra note 305, at 8.
311. Citron, Privacy Policymaking, supra note 273, at 775.
312. Dana Littlefield, ‘Revenge Porn’ Website Operator Convicted, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(Feb. 2, 2015, 6:07 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-revenge-porn-site-
operator-guilty-felony-charges-2015feb02-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/3Q2G-232Y].
313. Lyndsay Winkley & Dana Littlefield, Sentence Revised for Revenge Porn Site Operator,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 21, 2015, 5:09 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/
sdut-kevin-bollaert-revenge-porn-case-resentencing-2015sep21-story.html [https://perma.cc/
WA2P-YQAT].
314. See Complaint at 1-2, In re Craig Brittain, No. C-4564 (F.T.C. Jan. 29, 2015).
315. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Website Operator Banned from the ‘Revenge Porn’
Business After FTC Charges He Unfairly Posted Nude Photos (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.ftc.
gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/01/website-operator-banned-revenge-porn-business-after-
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Attorney General in an investigation of yet another revenge porn
site that solicited nude images and charged victims from $499 to
$2,800 for their removal.316 A federal court ordered the site to
destroy all intimate images and personal information in its pos-
session and to pay more than $2 million in penalties.317
Norms around data security have similarly emerged based on
federal and state enforcement activity. The FTC follows “a process-
based approach to data security, which entails assessing steps taken
by entities to achieve ‘reasonable security.’”318 State attorneys
general, adhering to this approach, often serve as “first responders”
to data breaches, at times in coordination with the FTC.319
The FTC and state attorneys general have brought investigations
in the wake of data breaches involving intimate information. For
instance, the FTC and the Vermont Attorney General’s office sued
the owners of Ashley Madison for failing to adequately secure cus-
tomers’ personal data.320 The Vermont Attorney General’s complaint
in state court highlighted the site’s failure “to maintain documented
information security policies” and to use “multi-factor authentica-
tion.”321 The complaint alleged that the site’s inadequate security
ftc-charges [https://perma.cc/ZU2Y-FM7V]; see also Citron & Hartzog, supra note 183. The
Cyber Civil Rights Initiative joined together with Without My Consent to file a comment to
the consent decree in that case. See Comments of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, Inc. &
Without My Consent, Inc., No. 132-3120, at 1 (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2015).
316. Complaint for Permanent Injunction & Other Equitable Relief, supra note 253, at 12;
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Nevada Obtain Order Permanently Shutting Down
Revenge Porn Site MyEx (June 22, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2018/06/ftc-nevada-obtain-order-permanently-shutting-down-revenge-porn [https://perma.cc/
CH4U-R8YL]. The Nevada Attorney General argued that the site violated state UDAP law
by intimidating people into paying for the removal of their photos. See Complaint for
Permanent Injunction & Other Equitable Relief, supra note 253, at 20.
317. FTC v. EMP Media, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00035-APG-NJK, 2018 WL 3025942, at *2-3 (D.
Nev. June 15, 2018), motion to set aside judgment denied, 334 F.R.D. 611 (D. Nev. Apr. 9,
2020).
318. Citron, Privacy Policymaking, supra note 273, at 781 (quoting Thomas J. Smedinghoff,
An Overview of Data Security Legal Requirements for All Business Sectors (Oct. 8, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2671323).
319. Id. at 780.
320. E.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Operators of AshleyMadison.com Settle FTC,
State Charges Resulting from 2015 Data Breach that Exposed 36 Million Users’ Profile
Information (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/12/
operators-ashleymadisoncom-settle-ftc-state-charges-resulting [https://perma.cc/9G9A-H9GV].
321. Consumer Protection Complaint at 4, Vermont v. Ruby Corp., No. 730-12-16 (Vt.
Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2016).
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amounted to an unfair business practice that risked “significant
harm to ... consumer[s’] reputation[s], relationships, and personal
li[ves]” and raised people’s risk of identity theft.322 The case resulted
in a consent decree with the FTC and settlements with state attor-
neys general.323
The New York Attorney General’s office similarly investigated
Jack’d, a gay, bisexual, and transgender dating app, for failing to
protect the nude images of approximately 1,900 individuals.324 The
dating app allegedly deceived customers by breaking its promise to
ensure the confidentiality of photos marked “private.”325 Although
the site had been warned about the security vulnerability more than
a year earlier, it had failed to take remedial action.326
3. Private Suits 
Civil suits have gained traction for deceptive collections of inti-
mate information related to networked sex toys. Subscribers sued
vibrator manufacturer Lovense for collecting intimate information
despite its promise that “[a]bsolutely no sensitive data (pictures,
video, chat logs) pass through (or are held) on our servers.”327 The
complaint alleged that the defendant intruded on the plaintiffs’
privacy by recording their communications and activities without
consent in violation of the federal and state wiretap laws and state
privacy tort law.328 Subscribers brought similar claims against
322. Id.
323. See Press Release, supra note 320.
324. Press Release, N.Y. State Off. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Announces





327. See First Amended Class Action Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 9, S.D. v.
Hytto Ltd., No. 18-cv-00688-JSW (N.D. Cal. Aug 23, 2018).
328. Id. at 14-15. The case presumably proceeded to discovery after the court rejected the
defendant’s motion to dismiss. S.D. v. Hytto Ltd., No. 18-cv-00688-JSW, 2019 WL 8333519,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2019).
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We-Vibe for recording information about their use of the defen-
dant’s vibrators.329 The case settled for $3.75 million.330
By contrast, individuals have been unable to hold platforms
accountable for hosting their nude images without consent.331
Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act (CDA) has
barred their efforts.332 The irony is significant—the CDA was prin-
cipally concerned with censoring porn (and was mostly struck
down), yet the only part of the law left standing now enables the
distribution of the very worst kinds of obscenity. Under section 230,
providers or users of interactive computer services are shielded from
liability for under- or over-filtering user-generated content.333
Section 230(c)(1) says that providers or users of interactive com-
puter services will not “be treated as ... publisher[s] or speaker[s] of
any information provided by another information content
provider.”334
Lower federal and state courts have dismissed victims’ civil
claims even though site operators solicited, chose to republish, or
failed to remove nonconsensual pornography.335 Section 230 did not
bar the state attorney general and FTC suits discussed above
329. See Amended Class Action Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 118, at 11-
14.
330. Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, Maker of ‘Smart’ Vibrators Settles Data Collection
Lawsuit for $3.75 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/
technology/we-vibe-vibrator-lawsuit-spying.html [https://perma.cc/83GY-QRSH]. This recalls
the success plaintiffs have had in obtaining redress after being secretly recorded in their
bedrooms. Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 7, at 1934 n.425 (collecting cases).
331. Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 413-14 (2017); Danielle Keats Citron,
Cyber Mobs, Disinformation, and Death Videos: The Internet as It Is (and as It Should Be), 118
MICH. L. REV. 1073, 1088-89 (2020) [hereinafter Citron, Cyber Mobs].
332. Citron & Wittes, supra note 331, at 413-14; Fostering a Healthier Internet to Protect
Consumers: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement
of Danielle Keats Citron, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law). For an
enlightening history of section 230’s adoption and judicial interpretation, see JEFF KOSSEFF,
THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019).
333. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); see also Citron & Wittes, supra note 331, at 416.
334. § 230(c)(1). Section 230(c)(2) extends the legal shield to “good faith” removal or block-
ing of offensive, harassing, or otherwise offensive user-generated content. Id. § 230(c)(2).
335. MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION (2019); CITRON, HATE CRIMES
IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 23, at 173-75; Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, The
Internet as a Speech Machine and Other Myths Confounding Section 230 Speech Reform, 2020
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 45, 46; Citron & Wittes, supra note 331, at 407; Mary Anne Franks, Sexual
Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 695 & n.197 (2012).
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because they concerned site operators’ own extortion schemes, not
their publication of user-generated content.336
Individuals have sued companies for failing to properly secure
personal information. Companies have faced lawsuits in the wake
of data breaches, but those suits are often dismissed early on in the
litigation due to the plaintiffs’ lack of standing or cognizable harm
under state law.337 Those lawsuits have a greater likelihood of sur-
viving motions to dismiss if plaintiffs have suffered financial harm,
such as identity theft, as opposed to the increased risk of such
harm.338
One might think antidiscrimination law would serve as a crucial
tool to preventing the use of discriminatory hiring algorithms in
employment decisions. The major barrier to private civil rights
claims (or even federal and state enforcement actions) is the opacity
of vendors’ proprietary systems. Firms may be mining intimate
information and ranking, rating, and scoring them in ways that
have a disparate impact on individuals from protected groups, but
any such impact is impossible to detect absent whistleblowers. If
corporate decisions relying on intimate information remain a black
box, there can be no basis for lawsuits challenging them.339
4. Criminal Law
Only a narrow set of commercial practices—spyware and cyber
stalking apps—implicate the criminal law. As I have explored in
prior work, Title III of the Wiretap Act includes a provision covering
those involved in the manufacture, sale, and advertisement of covert
surveillance devices.340 Congress passed that provision, 18 U.S.C.
336. See supra notes 318-26 and accompanying text; see also CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN
CYBERSPACE, supra note 23, at 175-76.
337. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 739-43 (2018).
338. Id. at 742.
339. See WEST ET AL., supra note 34, at 3-4 (explaining that AI tools claim to detect sexual-
ity from headshots and such systems replicate gender and racial bias in ways that deepen and
justify historical inequality but are often impossible to review and challenge when deployed
in the commercial sector); ALEX CAMPOLO, MADELYN SANFILIPPO, MEREDITH WHITTAKER &
KATECRAWFORD, AINOWINST.,AINOW2017REPORT 16 (2017),https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_
Now_2017_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFW4-4WDD].
340. Citron, Spying Inc., supra note 7, at 1263-64.
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§ 2512, to eliminate “a significant source of equipment” that is
“highly useful” for private nonconsensual surveillance.341
Section 2512 makes it a crime for someone to intentionally manu-
facture, sell, or advertise a device if they know or have reason to
know that its design “renders it primarily useful for the ... surrepti-
tious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications.”342
Defendants face fines, up to five years imprisonment, or both.343
Section 2512 covers “a relatively narrow category of devices whose
principal use is likely to be for wiretapping or eavesdropping.”344 At
least “[t]wenty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted
similar statutes.”345
Nonetheless, prosecutions remain rare. Despite the prevalence of
spyware and the hundreds of purveyors of cyber stalking apps,
federal prosecutors have only brought a handful of cases. As I have
noted elsewhere,
In September 2014, federal prosecutors brought § 2512 charges
against StealthGenie’s CEO Hammad Akbar. StealthGenie’s
spyware app secretly intercepted communications to and from
mobile phones.... The federal indictment alleged that the app’s
target population was “spousal cheat: Husband/Wife or boy-
friend/girlfriend suspecting their other half of cheating or any
other suspicious behavior or if they just want to monitor them.”
A federal judge issued a temporary restraining order authorizing
the FBI to disable the site hosting StealthGenie.346
The defendant pleaded guilty to the charges and was ordered to pay
$500,000 in fines.347 There have been no subsequent reported federal
criminal cases against spyware purveyors since the StealthGenie
341. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 95 (1968).
342. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b).
343. Id.
344. United States v. Shriver, 989 F.2d 898, 905 (7th Cir. 1992).
345. Citron, Spying Inc., supra note 7, at 1265 & n.132 (collecting statutes).
346. Id. at 1266-67 (footnotes omitted).
347. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Man Pleads Guilty for Selling “StealthGenie” Spy-
ware App and Ordered to Pay $500,000 Fine (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
man-pleads-guilty-selling-stealthgenie-spyware-app-and-ordered-pay-500000-fine
[https://perma.cc/NVS4-J7VD].
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case. At the state level, prosecutions “ha[ve] been virtually nonexis-
tent.”348
While criminal law provides a foothold for the prosecution of the
manufacturers, it has been hampered by the requirement that the
device be primarily designed for the secret interception of electronic
communications.349 As privacy advocate James Dempsey has argued,
the small number of section 2512 prosecutions is attributable, at
least in part, to “the fact that it is hard to demonstrate that
equipment is ‘primarily’ designed for stealth interception of commu-
nications.”350
Individual sexual-privacy invaders are a different matter, as my
prior scholarship has explored.351 Consider nonconsensual pornogra-
phy. Today, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and Guam
criminalize the posting of nude photos without consent.352 Law
enforcement has been slowly but surely pursuing cases under those
laws.353
III. REIMAGINING PROTECTIONS FOR INTIMATE INFORMATION
This Part sketches some guiding principles for the protection of
intimate information in the commercial sector. My goal is three-fold:
to stem the tidal wave of data collection; to restrict certain uses of
intimate data; and to expand the suite of remedies available to
courts.
348. Citron, Spying Inc., supra note 7, at 1267.
349. Id. at 1267-68 (citing James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age:
Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 111
(1997)).
350. Id.
351. Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 7, at 1931-33; Citron & Franks, supra note 47, at
387.
352. See 46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER C.R. INITI-
ATIVE (2020), https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/A69J-
B3WX]. In 2014, before Dr. Mary Anne Franks and the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative began
working with lawmakers, three states criminalized the practice. Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge
Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (2017); see also Citron
& Franks, supra note 47, at 371-74 (discussing the development of so-called revenge porn
laws).
353. See Citron, Privacy Policymaking, supra note 273, at 757-58.
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A. Special Protections for Intimate Information
Before turning to the special protections owed to intimate
information, I want to emphasize the need for strong baseline
protections for all personal data collected in the private sector.354
The reasons why we need sexual privacy support the adoption of
comprehensive data protections. Technological advances may soon
enable firms to turn innocuous personal data into intimate data
with a high degree of accuracy.355 Paul Ohm and Scott Peppet have
memorably termed this prospect “everything reveals everything.”356
Soon, if companies have enough information about us, no matter
how innocuous, they will be able to infer the most intimate infor-
mation about us. The “everything reveals everything” phenomenon
is why we need to stem the tide of over-collection and to restrict
downstream use, sharing, and storage of all personal data. Indeed,
someday soon, copious amounts of personal data will likely be
turned into intimate information. Thus, we need strong privacy
protections for even the most seemingly benign personal data, lest
it become a shell game whose end goal is the revelation of intimate
information.
Whether or not lawmakers pass comprehensive privacy reforms,
intimate information warrants special protection. If we can get law-
makers to act on this issue—the protection of intimate informa-
tion—then we should do so. This Section focuses on areas worthy of
reform. Certain data collection should be off-limits. Certain uses of
intimate data should be sharply restricted. Injunctive relief should
be available in court, including the possibility of a “data death
penalty” for the very worst sexual-privacy violators.357
354. Personally identifiable information is a central concept in privacy law. Paul M.
Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally
Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U.L.REV. 1814, 1816 (2011). Federal and state laws address
what constitutes personal information in different ways. Id. An organizing principle is
whether an individual is identified or can be reasonably identified. Id. at 1817.
355. Paul Ohm & Scott Peppet, What if Everything Reveals Everything?, in BIG DATA IS
NOT A MONOLITH 45, 55 (Cassidy R. Sugimoto, Hamid R. Ekbia & Michael Mattioli eds., 2016).
356. Id. at 45. That possibility certainly supports the call for strong baseline rules for the
handling of personal information.
357. See infra Part III.A.3.
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1. Limits on Collection 
The default assumptions around the handling of intimate
information must change. The norm of collection is not inevitable—
unless law and society make it so. The status quo jeopardizes crucial
aspects of human flourishing and well-being enabled by sexual
privacy.
The collection of intimate information can produce more upside
than downside in certain contexts. Law should work to ensure that
collection occurs in those contexts and no others. Although no legal
approach can guarantee this outcome, the following reforms are
offered with that goal in mind.
Certain collection practices should be off-limits. Law should
prohibit services whose raison d’être is the nonconsensual collection
of intimate data.358 Period. The end. No exceptions. Software that
“undresses” women in photographs runs afoul of this mandate. So
do apps that facilitate the secret and undetectable monitoring of
someone’s cellphone, as do sites hosting nonconsensual pornography
and deep fake sex videos. To ensure that this reform would apply to
revenge porn sites and their ilk, Congress should amend the federal
law shielding online services from liability for user-generated
content.359
We have recognized no-collection zones in other contexts.
American law has long banned the collection of information crucial
to the exercise of civil liberties. Under the Privacy Act of 1974, for
instance, federal agencies cannot collect information that exclu-
sively concerns individuals’ First Amendment activities.360 In
NAACP v. Alabama, the Supreme Court struck down a court order
requiring the civil rights group to produce its membership list on
the ground that privacy in group associations is indispensable to
358. Such a rule would reinforce, not defeat, sexual expression including the legal practice
of pornography—the recording and sharing of nude imagery with the subject’s explicit consent.
359. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act secures a shield from liability for sites
that under- or over-filter content provided by another information content provider. 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c). My prior work has explored suggestions for amending section 230, so I will not
belabor the point here. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 23, at 177-79;
Citron, Cyber Mobs, supra note 331, at 1088-91; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 40, at
117, 121-25; Citron & Franks, supra note 335; Citron & Wittes, supra note 331.
360. Privacy Act of 1974 § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7).
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preserving the freedom to associate.361 Apps and services designed
to facilitate the collection of intimate information without individu-
als’ permission are an equal affront to civil rights and civil liberties,
and they should be prohibited.
What about firms that fall outside the no-collection zone? Those
firms should be required to obtain meaningful consent from
individuals before collecting their intimate information. As a
baseline rule, firms should only be allowed to request consent to
collect intimate data if such collection is strictly necessary for a
legitimate business purpose or medical research.362
Now for some thoughts on the manner of the request. The “gold
standard of consent” has several features. To ensure meaningful
consent, requests for consent should be infrequent. Firms should not
be permitted to pepper people with requests.363 Repeated requests
overwhelm people and exert pressure on them to say yes. They often
succeed not because people have thought about the request and
actually agree but because they simply want firms to stop asking.364
Firms should spell out the request clearly and explain the risks in
concrete and vivid terms so that individuals understand what
happens if intimate data is leaked or improperly used or shared.365
The gold standard for consent combines the “knowing and
voluntary” waiver standard from constitutional law and the
informed consent standard from biomedical ethics.366 To satisfy the
knowing requirement, requests for consent must be clear and
understandable. They should explain what intimate data would be
collected, how it would be used, and how long it would be retained.
When possible, requests for consent should be made separately from
the process of signing up for a service. Moreover, such requests
should be designed in a way that enhances the likelihood that
people will understand them.367 Lessons from design psychology can
361. 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
362. This sort of approach should be followed for all personal data.
363. Richards & Hartzog, Pathologies of Digital Consent, supra note 46, at 1494.
364. Id. at 1493-94.
365. Id. at 1492. Richards and Hartzog also argue that for consent to be meaningful, it
must occur in contexts in which people have the incentive to take the request seriously. For
platforms collecting sensitive information, Richards and Hartzog argue that people may be
more inclined to consider the risks if requests do not arrive in dribs and drabs. Id. at 1498.
366. Id. at 1465, 1475.
367. Ryan Calo has done important work in this area. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Against
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be leveraged to make it more likely that people consider the ques-
tion rather than simply clicking “I Agree.”368 As for voluntariness,
requests for consent should not be “take it or leave it” propositions
if a firm can provide its service without collecting intimate data. It
should be as easy to reject requests as it is to accept them. Firms
should not make it difficult for people to deny requests. They should
also not be allowed to engage in other activity designed to “coerce,
wheedle, and manipulate people to grant [consent].”369
Consider the issue of consent in the context of a first-party data-
collector adult site. People should be given an easy way to decline a
porn site’s request to collect data so that they can easily continue
browsing and searching the site. Most porn sites do not need to
collect that data (the content that individuals have browsed and
searched) to operate. Thus, the adult site would need to present
individuals with a real choice. It would have to provide a good
reason for people to give up their privacy—money, additional
services, and the like—and it could only ask for permission if it had
a legitimate business reason, such as advertising, for collecting the
data and explained that reason. So long as requests are clear about
the contours of the trade, visceral about the risks, and made
infrequently, then individuals would have a chance to consider the
requests and make knowing and voluntary decisions.
Some apps and services require the collection of certain intimate
data to function—that is certainly true of many dating apps, to take
an example.370 There, requests for collection could permissibly be
presented as “take it or leave it.” Requests for consent would have
to make clear that the service depends upon the collection of
intimate data and that the firm would collect the data only to
provide the service and for no other reason. In that case, firms could
decline to provide their services to people who reject their request
without running afoul of the voluntariness requirement.
Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012). Calo
explores various mechanisms for delivering notice that rely on consumer experience rather
than entirely on words or symbols. Id. at 1039-47.
368. See Eur. Data Prot. Bd., Guidelines 05/2020 on Consent Under Regulation 2016/679,
at 21 (May 4, 2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_20
2005_consent_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/2PNB-C4FY].
369. Richards & Hartzog, Pathologies of Digital Consent, supra note 46, at 1489.
370. See, e.g., supra Part I.A.1.
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Not so for third-party data collectors. Third-party data collectors
must make clear that individuals can decline their requests without
consequence. They would have to spell out their legitimate business
interest in the intimate data. They would have to provide an
incentive for people to grant their request. Furthermore, they would
have to ensure that consent is meaningful in all other respects.
This approach is autonomy-respecting: it lets people decide for
themselves if their intimate data is collected for a legitimate
business purpose, such as advertising or research. It is intimacy-
enhancing: people will be more inclined to use apps and services to
communicate with partners if they are not worried about the
unwanted collection of intimate data. This approach erects road-
blocks that are currently absent in the now-unbridled world of
corporate intimate surveillance.
With less collection comes less risk. Less collection would curtail
downstream damage. It would also reduce the incidence of data
breaches leaking intimate data to blackmailers, extorters, and
reputation destroyers. There would be fewer misuses of intimate
data in ways that deprive women, sexual minorities, and nonwhite
people of crucial life opportunities.
This recommendation would alter the ground rules for the
marketplace of intimate information. At present, third-party
advertisers and data brokers do not have to ask people for permis-
sion to track their intimate data.371 They do not have to pay people
for it. Advertisers and data brokers would have to internalize some
of the costs of the data-collection imperative. They would have to
seek meaningful consent to collect intimate data and offer a
legitimate business reason for doing so. They would have to offer
individuals something for their intimate information.
The gains for sexual privacy are worth the potential loss in data
brokerage and advertising profits. The advertising and data broker-
age industries would not end. Instead, all that would end would be
the default presumption that intimate information can be collected
371. Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez & Srikanth Sundaresan, 7 in 10 Smartphone Apps Share
Your Data with Third-Party Services, SCI. AM. (May 30, 2017), https://www.scientificamer
ican.com/article/7-in-10-smartphone-apps-share-your-data-with-third-party-services/ [https://
perma.cc/BT29-W82G] (“[O]nce an app has permission to collect [your personal] information,
it can share your data with anyone the app’s developer wants to—letting third-party
companies track where you are, how fast you’re moving and what you’re doing.”).
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unbeknownst to individuals and without their permission. The sky
would not fall.
My experience working with companies and lawmakers on the
nonconsensual hosting of nude images informs this approach. Cyber
Civil Rights Initiative President and my frequent collaborator Mary
Anne Franks has long argued that nude images should not be
posted online without written consent.372 After the first California
Cyber Exploitation Task Force in-person meeting in the spring of
2015, Franks suggested as much to a tech company safety official.
Her suggestion, wise then and wise now, was met with shock and
dismay. The safety official—a thoughtful person with extensive
content moderation experience—explained that social media com-
panies could not possibly require prior written consent from the
subject of a photo before the subject’s nude images were posted
online. “Why not?” we asked. The official responded that if written
consent was required, then it might be more likely that nude photos
would not be posted because the subjects of those photos would not
give their consent.
Then, as now, we wondered what the problem was.373 As we noted
then, written consent would not prevent the posting of nude photos,
just nude photos in which the subject did not consent (or at least in
which the poster was not willing to sign something saying that the
subject consented to the posting). This sentiment applies not only to
sites trafficking in nonconsensual pornography and deep fake sex
videos but also to data brokers and advertisers. If firms want to
collect intimate information, then they should obtain people’s
knowing and voluntary consent to do so.
Privacy laws covering certain sensitive information often include
affirmative consent requirements though they fall short of the “gold
standard.” The Illinois Biometric Identification Privacy Act con-
ditions the collection of biometric data on consent given after a firm
informs consumers of the fact that biometric information is being
collected and stored; the reason for the collection, use, and storage;
and the duration of the storage.374 HIPAA’s Privacy Rule permits
data use necessary for the treatment, payment, or health care
372. See, e.g., Franks, supra note 352, at 1283.
373. Of course, we knew the problem was that online platforms optimize for likes, clicks,
and shares so that they can earn advertising income.
374. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b) (2020).
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system operations data and requires consent for any uses beyond
those purposes.375 Under federal law, cable providers generally may
not disclose subscribers’ information to anyone without subscribers’
consent.376
An alternative approach would be to limit the collection of
intimate information to instances in which entities have a legiti-
mate, reasonable basis for collecting intimate data and in which
individuals would reasonably expect the collection.377 The advertis-
ing industry would surely prefer this approach. Advertisers have a
legitimate business reason for collecting personal data, and their
practices might comport with people’s reasonable expectations
depending on the context. The outcome would be different for data
brokers. People do not reasonably expect unknown shadowy actors
to amass their intimate information in digital dossiers. In my view,
this approach is far less compelling than requiring meaningful
consent. Left as it is, the data collection imperative for intimate
data would continue with too little friction restraining it.
Finally, it is worth noting the synergy between limits on collection
and limits on the retention of intimate information. Restrictions on
collection should be paired with an obligation to delete or otherwise
destroy intimate information as soon as it is no longer needed to
fulfill the purpose prompting its collection. This obligation would
minimize the potential for leaks or the sale of intimate data.378 The
375. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1) (2019).
376. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c). The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation requires
opt-in consent for the placement of tracking cookies. See GDPR, supra note 103, at 38. For
sensitive information including information about individuals’ sexuality, companies can only
collect such information with explicit, affirmative consent. Id.
377. For thoughtful proposals on the issue, see Kerry, Proposed Language, supra note 46
(“Collection and processing [defined terms] of personal data shall have a reasonable,
articulated basis that takes into account reasonable business needs of the [covered
entity/controller/etc.] engaged in the collection balanced with the intrusion on the privacy and
the interests of persons whom the data relates to.”). Kerry notes, and I agree, that his
proposal would “take provisions or rulemaking that exclude certain sensitive data fields or
targeting to establish boundaries for behavioral advertising.” Id. He notes further that “even
if behavioral advertising in general is considered a reasonable business purpose, this
collection language could be construed as barring Target’s processing of purchasing data to
deliver ads for maternity products to a secretly pregnant teenager as an excessive intrusion
on her privacy and interests.” Id.
378. See Seda Gürses, Carmela Troncoso & Claudia Diaz, Engineering Privacy by Design
Reloaded 14-15 (2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/
Engineering-PbD-Reloaded.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4E8-989Q].
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Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Video Privacy Protection
Act (VPPA) similarly require the destruction of records from
background checks or movie watching as soon as practicable.379
Under the GDPR, the European Union’s data protection law,
personal data can be kept only for as long as is necessary to fulfill
the original basis for its collection and processing.380
2. Use Restrictions
Policymakers should restrict the uses of intimate data to protect
the opportunities secured by sexual privacy and reduce the risks to
well-being. Companies collect massive quantities of personal
information on the expectation that it will generate significant
returns. As Paul Ohm observes: “Chasing profits, [companies] hoard
this data for future, undefined uses; redistribute it to countless
third parties; and repurpose it in ways their customers never
imagined.”381
Intimate data collected for a legitimate business purpose should
not be repurposed for another reason without obtaining separate
permission. This mirrors the approach of the Fair Information
Practice Principles (FIPPs).382 The FIPPs are the foundation for
most privacy laws in the United States and around the world, as
well as for most understandings of information ethics.383 Under the
FIPPs, information obtained for one purpose cannot be used or made
available for other purposes without the person’s consent.384 That
379. 15 U.S.C. § 1681w (discussing disposal of records in consumer financial information
context); 18 U.S.C. § 2710(e) (requiring destruction of old records in context of video rental or
sale records).
380. GDPR, supra note 103, at 35 (“Personal data shall be ... adequate, relevant and limited
to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed (‘data
minimisation’).”).
381. Ohm, supra note 44, at 1128.
382. The Code of Fair Information Practices, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/pri
vacy/consumer/code_fair_info.html [https://perma.cc/GS43-AAY3]. The FIPPs were first artic-
ulated by privacy scholar Alan Westin in 1967 and popularized by the U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973. See id.; ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
(1967).
383. See, e.g., Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum, DEP’T. HOMELAND SEC. (Dec. 30,
2008), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-policy-guidance-
memorandum-2008-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/9X9F-QQGV].
384. See Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 341, 350 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006).
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restriction is often referred to as a “secondary use limitation.”385 A
better way to put it would be as a default ban on the nonconsensual
secondary use of intimate data unless that ban had been lifted.386
Under this approach, firms could not use properly collected
intimate data for other purposes without meaningful consent. In
that context, obtaining separate, meaningful consent would be
expensive. As the bioethics field shows,387 having to track people
down and ask them for separate permission to use intimate data for
a distinct purpose would be costly. Those costs would ensure that
firms only ask if they think that the costs of asking are worth it.
Subscribers’ intimate information, of course, could be used for the
purpose for which it was collected and for which firms obtained
meaningful consent. To return to the case of a dating app, this
would include allowing subscribers to message each other and to
post intimate information.
We also need clear rules against the exploitation of intimate
information to manipulate people to act in ways consistent with
another’s ends rather than their own. As explored in Part II,388 law
enforcers have investigated uses of personal data to target the
vulnerabilities of protected groups as unfair commercial practices.389
Such cases, however, remain rare. A ban would make clear that
such practices are unlawful and would thus reduce the need for
enforcement actions directed at such exploitative practices.390 More
broadly, privacy law should require firms to act in the best interest
of individuals whose intimate data they have collected consistent
with a duty of loyalty and care.391
Strong use restrictions would protect sexual privacy and the
human flourishing that it makes possible. Individuals would not
385. Id.; The Code of Fair Information Practices, supra note 382.
386. Thanks to Ryan Calo for suggesting this.
387. See, e.g., Celia B. Fisher & Deborah M. Layman, Genomics, Big Data, and Broad
Consent: A New Ethics Frontier for Prevention Science, 19 PREVENTION SCI. 871, 874 (2018).
388. See supra Part II.C.2.
389. HARTZOG, supra note 276, at 131 (explaining that UDAP laws are designed to prevent
the exploitation of human vulnerabilities).
390. See Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 43, 97-98 (2021).
391. Richards & Hartzog, supra note 13, at 5-6; Richards & Hartzog, Pathologies of Digital
Consent, supra note 46, at 1500 (arguing that lawmakers should create rules designed to
protect our trust—meaning “being discreet with our data, honest about the risk of data prac-
tices, protective of our personal information, and, above all, loyal to us, the data subjects”).
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have their autonomy undermined by a dating app’s repurposing of
their intimate data. They would not be chilled from using
reproductive-health apps for fear that their struggles with painful
periods or infertility would be used in assessments other than
tracking their reproduction, such as employment or insurance
matters. These restrictions would ban uses of intimate data that
deny people crucial life opportunities without their say so. In that
way, it would establish important protections such that crucial life
opportunities are enjoyed by women, sexual minorities, and non-
white people on equal terms.
3. Remedies: Halt Processing and the Data Death Penalty
Injunctive relief against improper processing of intimate data
should be part of the suite of remedies for the very worst
offenders.392 Privacy debates of late have focused on the wisdom of
recognizing civil actions for damages or administrative fines.393
Injunctive relief, however, has not been a key part of the discussion.
It should be.
Privacy legislation should recognize judicial power to order
injunctive relief in cases involving serial offenders. In such cases,
injunctive relief should be mandatory to assure meaningful pro-
tection of sexual privacy and make clear its priority over competing
interests.394
392. The topic of privacy remedies has not attracted sustained attention. Lauren Henry
Scholz’s important work is an important exception. See, e.g., Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy
Remedies, 94 IND. L.J. 653 (2019) (arguing for the recognition of restitution as a privacy
remedy).
393. See, e.g., Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 773,
831 (2020) (“[A]ny new privacy law must include a private right of action.... Civil litigation
made dangerous machines safer; private lawsuits gave us seatbelts, stronger automobile
frames, safer doors, side impact protection, and many other car safety features. Little if any
of that would have happened if car safety was the exclusive responsibility of a small,
underfunded regulatory agency that has acceded to a self-governing privacy regime.”
(footnotes omitted)). Industry lobbyists strongly oppose privacy bills that include private
rights of action. Issie Lapowsky, Tech Lobbyists Push to Defang California’s Landmark
Privacy Law, WIRED (Apr. 29, 2019, 3:09 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/california-privacy-
law-tech-lobby-bills-weaken/ [https://perma.cc/Z77Q-8E2W]. Private rights of action are
essential given the limited resources available to federal and state law enforcers.
394. Lawmakers must make clear that such injunctive relief is automatic. In the absence
of clear legislative intent, courts are reluctant to order equitable remedies. See, e.g., Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). There is an extensive scholarly debate about
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As for substantive duties so for remedies: civil rights law provides
a model for reform. Injunctive relief is a core feature of civil rights
law.395 Federal, state, and local antidiscrimination statutes permit
injunctive relief,396 and courts have employed equitable remedies in
flexible and creative ways. In workplace sexual harassment cases,
for example, courts have ordered employers to implement anti-
harassment policies and procedures, provide training, retain
personnel records, and install security cameras.397
Lawmakers should recognize a court’s power to order parties to
halt processing intimate information for repeat offenders. Figuring
out if a firm qualifies as a repeat offender would entail three steps.
Under the first step, the court would issue an order directing the
party to fulfill its legal obligations. If the court is presented with
clear evidence that the party has violated the first order, then the
court would turn to the second step. Under the second step, the
court would order the firm to stop processing intimate data until
compliance has been achieved as shown by an independent third-
party audit.398 For the third and final step, if the court is shown
clear evidence that the party has failed to comply for the third time,
whether courts should be required to issue injunctions to remedy statutory violations. Michael
T. Morley, Enforcing Equality: Statutory Injunctions, Equitable Balancing Under eBay, and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 194. In the environmental context,
Daniel Farber argues that when statutes impose absolute duties on people, injunctive relief
is essential to prevent future violations. Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties,
and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 513, 515 (1984).
395. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 6 (1978) (explaining that injunctive
relief was understood after Brown v. Board of Education as the most effective way to guar-
antee civil rights). For a thoughtful exploration of how courts exercise their equitable powers
granted under Title VII, see Morley, supra note 394.
396. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 204(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a); 43 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 962(c)(3) (West 2020); Availability of Injunctive Relief Under State Civil
Rights Acts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 174, 180 (1956). In some civil rights statutes, injunctions are
the only available remedy. For instance, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act only
allows injunctive relief as opposed to monetary damages. E.g., Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co.,
333 F.3d 299, 304 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12188(a)(1)).
397. See, e.g., United States v. Greenwood Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:03-cv-01055-DFH-TAB,
at 2-3 (S.D. Ind. July 28, 2003); Carey v. O’Reilly Auto. Stores, No. 18-81588-CIV, 2019 WL
3412170, at *10-11 (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2019) (declining, at an early stage of the litigation, to
dismiss plaintiff ’s requests for injunctive relief in the form of the installation of “monitored
security cameras” and the termination of “certain employees”), report and recommendation
adopted, 2019 WL 3408926 (S.D. Fla. June 17, 2019).
398. A schedule would be set to report the auditor’s findings to the court.
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then and only then would the court impose what can be called the
“data death penalty”—an order permanently stopping the firm from
processing intimate information.
Under a stop-processing order, providers of cyber stalking apps
and sites devoted to nonconsensual pornography would have to halt
their services.399 Such orders would be crucial to securing an ef-
fective remedy to individuals whose sexual privacy had been re-
peatedly violated.
There is nothing novel about a halt-processing remedy. Under
article 58 of the GDPR, data protection authorities have authority
to impose temporary or permanent bans on the processing of
personal data.400 Halt processing orders must be “appropriate,
necessary and proportionate” to ensure compliance with legal
obligations.401 In 2019, the Hamburg Commissioner for Data
Protection and Freedom of Information started an administrative
procedure to stop Google employees and contractors from listening
to voice recordings of Google Home device subscribers for three
months.402 The Hamburg Commissioner explained that, “effective
protection of those affected from eavesdropping, documenting and
evaluating private conversations by third parties can only be
achieved by prompt execution.”403 Google responded by pledging not
to transcribe voice recordings collected from its personal assistant
device.404
European Union data protection authorities had been issuing
halt-processing orders even before the GDPR’s adoption. For
instance, Ireland’s data protection authority ordered Loyaltybuild
399. In the case of revenge porn sites and their ilk, such relief would depend upon changes
to section 230. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
400. GDPR, supra note 103, at 24.
401. Id.
402. Press Release, Hamburg Comm’r for Data Prot. & Freedom Info., Speech Assistance
Systems Put to the Test – Data Protection Authority Opens Administrative Proceedings
Against Google (Aug. 1, 2019), https://datenschutz-hamburg.de/assets/pdf/2019-08-01_press-
release-Google_Assistant.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC87-2GWL]. The GDPR permits data pro-
tection authorities to take measures to protect the rights of data subjects for a period not to
exceed three months. Id.
403. Id. Recall that whistleblowers reported that Google Home was inadvertently recording
private and intimate conversations and that contractors were transcribing those conver-
sations in order to analyze whether the device was correctly processing information. See
Haselton, supra note 135.
404. Press Release, supra note 402. Google seemingly has not altered its position.
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to halt processing personal data for three months after learning that
the firm’s data breach involved the personal data of 1.5 million
people.405 The firm was directed to notify clients about the security
breach, delete certain data, and achieve compliance with PCI-DSS
standards for the processing of credit card data.406 It took the
company seven months to fulfill those obligations.407
To be sure, even temporary stop-processing orders exact signifi-
cant costs. Loyaltybuild lost millions of euros in revenue, a consider-
able blow to the firm.408 For some entities, halting processing for
even a month might cause their collapse. New entrants will no
doubt find it more challenging to absorb the costs of stop-processing
orders than established entities.409 But the grave risk to individuals
and society posed by the handling of intimate information warrants
strong remedies.
B. Objections
The new compact will raise questions about the market and free
speech. This Section addresses some concerns about the broader
social welfare consequences of my reform proposals. It explains why
the reform proposals enhance free speech values and would
withstand First Amendment challenges.
405. Cease Processing Orders Under GDPR: How the Irish DPA Views Enforcement, IAPP





409. At a faculty workshop at Boston University School of Law, David Webber and Michael
Meuer asked me about potential perverse incentives of stop-processing orders. Might new
entrants collect intimate information in violation of the law and then just shut down and
restart in a game of endless whack-a-mole? That is surely possible depending on the start-up
costs and availability of necessary financing. Criminals have certainly engaged in this sort
of whack-a-mole activity in the face of shut-down orders as in the case of Anon-IB. See Uchill,
supra note 186. Nonetheless, the reputational costs of this strategy would be significant. New
entrants seeking third-party capitalization would be less inclined to engage in this sort of
behavior.
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1. Market
These proposals would surely change the value proposition for
many online services. A significant number of apps and services
explored above do not charge fees for their services because they
earn advertising money.410 In some markets, third parties may have
invested in them as we have seen in the sexual wellness and dating
markets.411 As a result, people might have more limited choices.
If advertising fees and outside funding dropped significantly,
firms would surely look to other revenue sources. They might charge
subscription fees. They might keep basic services at low or no cost
and increase the costs for premium or add-on services. A nontrivial
number of people might not be able to afford these services.
Nonprofit organizations might support efforts to provide some
services free of charge. The femtech market seems a likely possibil-
ity. Reproductive justice organizations might contribute funds for
period-tracking apps providing helpful and truthful information.
LGBTQ advocacy groups might hire technologists to create dating
apps for community members.
Some gaps would remain, leaving some people unable to afford
dating apps, period-tracking services, and subscriptions to adult
sites. Failing to protect intimate data exacts too great a cost to
sexual privacy even if it means that services tracking intimate life
remain out of reach for some.
More broadly, we should not discount the role that privacy plays
in enhancing market operations. As Ryan Calo has explored, a
410. See Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 10, at 633.
411. Dana Olsen, The Top 13 VC Investors in Femtech Startups, PITCHBOOK (Nov. 2, 2018),
https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/the-top-13-vc-investors-in-femtech-startups
[https://perma.cc/M8EY-LH7A] (explaining that a decade ago only $23 million worth of
venture capital was invested in the global femtech industry whereas there has been nearly
$400 million in venture capital funding in 2018); Kate Clark, Dating Startup Raises VC as
Facebook Enters the Relationship Biz, PITCHBOOK (May 4, 2018), https://pitchbook.com/news/
articles/dating-app-raises-vc-as-facebook-enters-the-relationship-biz [https://perma.cc/B8FW-
SPT3] (explaining that app-based dating services have attracted venture funding including
apps like Happn, Hinge, Clover, and The League). 2018 set records for investment in apps
devoted to women’s and men’s health issues. Olsen, supra note 55. Two venture capital funds
have emerged that are devoted exclusively to investing in the funding of women’s health
enterprises. Id. One of those firms, Astarte Ventures, has invested in Lola, a startup that
“provides subscription-based delivery of organic tampons, Flo, ... a period-tracking app, and
Future Family, a business that offers reproductive healthcare services.” Id.
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firm’s commitment to privacy engenders trust.412 Individuals may be
more inclined to pay to use services because they believe that a
firm’s service is worth their price.413
2. Free Speech
The proposed reforms will garner objections on free speech
grounds. For some scholars, all data privacy laws regulate “speech”
and thus may be inconsistent with the First Amendment.414 These
arguments illustrate what Leslie Kendrick has criticized as “First
Amendment expansionism”—the tendency to treat speech as norma-
tively significant no matter the actual speech in question.415 As
Kendrick underscored, freedom of speech is a “term of art that does
not refer to all speech activities, but rather designates some area of
activity that society takes, for some reason, to have special impor-
tance.”416
Just because activity can be characterized as speech does not
mean that the First Amendment protects it from government
regulation.417 Neil Richards helpfully explains that free speech
protections hinge on whether government regulations of commercial
data flows are “particularly threatening to longstanding First
Amendment values.”418 Indeed.
412. Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 650
(2015).
413. Id. at 661.
414. E.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051
(2000) (arguing that government imposed fair information practice rules that restrict the
ability of speakers to communicate truthful data about others is inconsistent with basic First
Amendment principles); Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63 (2014)
(“[F]or all practical purposes, and in every context relevant to the current debates in
information law, data is speech.”).
415. Citron & Franks, supra note 335, at 60 (citing Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment
Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 1212 (2015)).
416. Kendrick, supra note 415, at 1212.
417. Id.
418. Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1501, 1507 (2015). For a compelling exploration of those values and how the First
Amendment should be understood to secure and enhance the diversity and vitality of public
debate, see Genevieve Lakier, The First Amendment’s Real Lochner Problem, 87 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1241 (2020).
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The assertion that all speech (or all data) has normative signifi-
cance elides the different reasons why speech (or data) warrants
protection from particular government regulations but not others.419
Some government regulations censor speech central to self-gover-
nance or the search for truth while others raise no such concerns.420
Some government regulations imperil speech crucial to self-
expression while others pose no such threat.421
The proposed reforms would not threaten First Amendment
values. The nonconsensual surveillance of intimate life is not
necessary for the public to figure out how to govern itself. Requiring
meaningful consent to handle data about people’s HIV status,
abortion, sex toy use, or painful cramps would have little impact on
discourse about political, cultural, or other matters of societal
concern. People’s miscarriages, erectile dysfunction, abortions, and
sexual fantasies have nothing to do with art, politics, or social
issues. Nude photos posted without consent contribute nothing to
discussions about issues of broad societal interest. Someone’s
abortion, miscarriage, and rape are not facts or ideas to be debated
in the service of public debate.
Regulating the surveillance of intimate life with explicit consent
requirements and narrow no-collection zones would not chill self-
expression but rather secure the basic conditions for self-expression
and engagement in self-governance.422 The nonconsensual collection
of people’s sex toy habits or porn site searches risks undermining
their willingness to engage in sexual expression.423 People whose
nude photos appear on revenge porn sites have difficulty interacting
with others and often retreat from online engagement and self-
expression.424 The handling of intimate information risks self-
censorship and a retreat from public debate—the result is less
diverse voices in the mix.
The Supreme Court has made clear the inextricable tie between
the absence of privacy protections and the chilling of self-expression.
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court observed that “the fear
419. See Kendrick, supra note 415, at 1212-13.
420. See id. at 1214.
421. See id. at 1213.
422. Citron & Richards, supra note 210, at 1379.
423. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 23, at 195.
424. Id.
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of public disclosure of private conversations might well have a
chilling effect on private speech.”425 In Carpenter v. United States,
the Court held that pervasive, persistent police surveillance of
location information enables inferences about one’s sexuality and
intimate partners so as to chill “familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations.”426
With the proposed reforms, people would be less fearful of
engaging in sexual and gender expression or interacting with close
friends and lovers. If individuals trust firms to use intimate
information only for the purpose for which it was collected and no
other unless they say otherwise, then they will be more willing to
use those services to experiment with ideas and to share their
innermost thoughts and confidences. They will be more inclined to
browse sites devoted to gender experimentation and to express
themselves on dating apps.
For all of these reasons, the Court has made clear that laws
regulating speech about “purely private” matters do not raise the
same constitutional concerns as laws restricting speech on matters
of public interest.427 As the Court explained in Snyder v. Phelps,
speech on public matters enjoys rigorous protection “to ensure that
we do not stifle public debate.”428 In contrast, speech about “purely
private” matters receives “less rigorous” protection because the
threat of liability would not risk chilling the “meaningful dialogue
of ideas” and “robust debate of public issues.”429 Its restriction “does
not pose the risk of ‘a reaction of self-censorship’ on matters of
public import.”430 Indeed, without such restrictions, we risk self-
425. 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001); see also CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note
23, at 208-10 (discussing the Court’s recognition in Bartnicki v. Vopper that privacy protec-
tions foster private speech).
426. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018); see also Gray & Citron, supra
note 172, at 77 (exploring the chilling effect of indiscriminate, continuous police collection of
geolocation data).
427. Kenneth S. Abraham & Edward G. White, First Amendment Imperialism and the
Constitutionalization of Tort Liability, 98 TEX. L. REV. 813, 857 (2020). As Kenneth Abraham
and Edward White argue, the “all speech is free speech” view devalues the special cultural
and social salience of speech about matters of public concern. Id. at 818-19.
428. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011). For an extended discussion of Snyder v.
Phelps, see CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 23, at 213-15.
429. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452.
430. Id. (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760
(1985) (plurality opinion)).
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censorship on purely private matters crucial to self-development,
close relationships, and the experience of love. To illustrate a
“purely private matter,” the Court pointed to an individual’s credit
report and videos showing someone engaged in sexual activity.431
The proposed reforms suggested here relate to purely private mat-
ters, including videos showing someone engaged in sexual activity.
The proposed reforms comport with First Amendment doctrine.432
Rules governing the collection of information raise few, if any, First
Amendment concerns.433 These rules “prohibit[ ] information collec-
tion by separating the public sphere from the private.”434 Trespass
laws, intrusion on seclusion tort claims, and video-voyeurism
statutes have withstood constitutional challenge.435 Courts have
upheld laws requiring informed consent before entities can collect
personal data, such as FCRA, federal and state wiretapping laws,
and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA).436
Many of my reform proposals center on obtaining people’s consent
before firms collect or use intimate information. The Court has held
“that private decisionmaking can avoid government partiality and
thus insulate privacy measures from First Amendment chal-
lenge.”437 Indeed, explicit consent is part and parcel of data collec-
tion laws like FCRA, COPPA, and VPPA.438
As Neil Richards argues, “information collection rules ... do not
fall within the scope of the First Amendment under either current
First Amendment doctrine or theory.”439 Rather, such “rules are of
431. Id. at 452-53. In the latter instance, the employee’s loss of public employment was
constitutionally permissible because the videos shed no light on the employer’s operation and
instead concerned speech on purely private matters. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84-
85 (2004) (per curiam).
432. RICHARDS, supra note 201, at 157.
433. Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1149, 1182 (2005).
434. Id.
435. RICHARDS, supra note 201, at 155-57. It is also worth noting that statutes prohibiting
the disclosure of purely private matters like nonconsensual pornography or health data have
been upheld in the face of First Amendment challenges. For an example of judicial refusal to
strike down a law against nonconsensual porn, see People v. Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439 (Ill.
2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 233 (2020).
436. See Richards, supra note 433, at 1167-68, 1185.
437. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 573-74 (2011) (citing Rowan v. Post Office
Dep’t., 397 U.S. 728 (1970)).
438. See Richards, supra note 433, at 1185.
439. Id. at 1186.
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‘general applicability,’ neither discriminating against nor signifi-
cantly impacting the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment.”440 The Supreme Court has held that even media defendants
enjoy no privilege against the application of ordinary private law in
their efforts to collect newsworthy information.441
Trespassers cannot avoid liability by contending that they
infringed others’ property rights in order to collect information.442
Computer hackers cannot avoid criminal penalties by insisting that
they were only trying to obtain information.443 Websites cannot
avoid responsibility under COPPA by insisting that they should not
have to ask for parental consent because they need access to
children’s online information.444 Employers cannot avoid liability
under FCRA by arguing that they are just trying to learn about
people and so should not have to ask for permission to see their
credit reports.445
Reform proposals restricting the use of intimate information
without meaningful consent would not run afoul of the First
Amendment. Countless laws restrict certain uses of personal
information, from state and federal antidiscrimination laws and
trade secret laws to FCRA and census rules.446 Laws restricting
secondary uses of information have not been held to violate the First
Amendment.447 In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court assessed
the First Amendment implications of legal prohibitions on the use
or disclosure of intercepted communications.448 The Court under-
scored that “the prohibition against the ‘use’ of the contents of an
illegal interception ... [is] a regulation of conduct” whereas the
prohibition of the disclosure or publication of information amounts
to speech.449
440. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991)).
441. Id. at 1188 (“[I]n Cohen v. Cowles Media, the Court held that ‘[t]he press may not with
impunity break and enter an office or dwelling to gather news.’” (second alteration in original)
(quoting Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669)).
442. See id. at 1182.
443. See id. at 1185.
444. See id. at 1203-04.
445. See id. at 1191.
446. See id. at 1190-91.
447. Id. at 1194.
448. 532 U.S. 514, 517-18 (2001).
449. Id. at 526-27.
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Sorrell v. IMS Health, decided in 2011, does not cast doubt on the
likely constitutionality of the collection and use restrictions
suggested here.450 In Sorrell, the Court struck down a Vermont law
banning two types of activities.451 First, the law prohibited pharma-
cies, health insurers, or similar entities from disclosing doctors’
prescription data for marketing purposes.452 Second, the law
prohibited pharmaceutical companies and health data brokers from
using doctors’ prescription data for marketing purposes unless the
medical prescriber consented.453 Data brokers and an association of
pharmaceutical companies challenged the regulations on the
grounds that they violated their free-speech rights.454
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, struck down the law on
First Amendment grounds.455 Under First Amendment doctrine,
discrimination against particular speakers or messages—known as
viewpoint-based discrimination—is “presumptively unconstitu-
tional.”456 The Sorrell Court found that the law did precisely that. It
held that the “law impose[d] a burden based on the content of the
speech and the identity of the speaker.”457 The majority underscored
that the law “imposed content- and speaker-based restrictions on
the availability and use of prescriber-identifying information.”458
As the majority found, the law told pharmacies and regulated
entities that they could not sell or give away prescription data for
marketing purposes but it could be sold or given away for purposes
other than marketing.459 Under the law, pharmacies could share
prescriber information with academics and other private entities.460
The Court explained, “The State has burdened a form of protected
expression that it found too persuasive. At the same time, the State
has left unburdened those speakers whose messages are not in
accord with its own views. This the State cannot do.”461
450. See 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
451. Id. at 557.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 561.
455. Id. at 557.
456. RICHARDS, supra note 201, at 80.
457. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567.
458. Id. at 571.
459. Id. at 562.
460. Id. at 563.
461. Id. at 580.
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The Court found viewpoint-based discrimination in the law’s
targeting of specific speakers—data brokers and pharmaceutical
companies—and not others.462 As the majority noted, academic
institutions could buy prescription data “in countering the messages
of brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and in promoting the
prescription of generic drugs,” but pharmaceutical companies and
detailers were denied the “means of purchasing, acquiring, or using
prescriber-identifying information.”463
The majority rejected the State’s argument that the consent
provision insulated the law’s use restriction from constitutional
concerns.464 The problem was that the State gave “doctors a
contrived choice: Either consent, which will allow your prescriber-
identifying information to be disseminated and used without
constraint; or, withhold consent, which will allow your information
to be used by those speakers whose message the State supports.”465
The majority explained that privacy could be chosen only if it
“acquiesce[d] in the State’s goal of burdening disfavored speech by
disfavored speakers.”466
The Court held that the State failed to provide a sufficiently
compelling reason to justify the law and that the State’s interest
was proportional to the burdens placed on speech and that the law
sought to “suppress a disfavored message.”467 Moreover, the law
failed to advance the interest of medical privacy, as the State
claimed, given that it did not restrict the sale or use of prescriber
data for countless reasons other than marketing.468 The majority
emphasized that the law allowed prescriber data “to be studied and
used by all but a narrow class of disfavored speakers.”469
Bambauer has suggested470 that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Sorrell casts doubt on the constitutionality of data protection laws
by recognizing that “a strong argument [exists] that prescriber-
462. Id. at 565.
463. Id. at 564.
464. Id. at 580.
465. Id. at 574.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 572.
468. Id. at 562-63.
469. Id. at 573.
470. See Bambauer, supra note 414, at 71 (quoting Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570).
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identifying information is speech for First Amendment purposes.”471
But the majority went out of its way to say that its finding did not
spell the end for all privacy law. Instead, Justice Kennedy, in
dictum, affirmed the constitutionality of sectoral privacy laws like
the federal health privacy law.472 He explained if Vermont had
“advanced its asserted privacy interest by allowing the information’s
sale or disclosure in only a few narrow and well-justified circum-
stances” as in HIPAA, the law would have been constitutional.473
Neil Richards contends that the Sorrell holding is quite narrow.
In his telling, the Court struck down the law not because it regu-
lated data flows amounting to protected speech but because it lack-
ed a “more coherent policy” and imposed impermissible viewpoint
restrictions.474 Richards has the better reading here. The majority
explained that it had “no need to determine whether all speech
hampered by [the law] is commercial” or pure speech.475 Instead, it
focused on the viewpoint discrimination—that the law sought to
“suppress a disfavored message”—and the State’s failure to show
that the law directly advanced a substantial government interest
and that the measure was drawn to achieve that interest.476
Crucially, as Richards explains, the Court made clear that “the
statute would have been less problematic if it had imposed greater
duties of confidentiality” (as well as requirements of explicit consent
and use restrictions) on the data.477
CONCLUSION
This is an auspicious time to call for a new compact for sexual
privacy. Dozens upon dozens of privacy bills are under consideration
at the federal and state levels.478 Privacy law reform should provide
471. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570. Jane Bambauer argues that if data is speech than privacy
regulations always burden the production of knowledge. Bambauer, supra note 414, at 63.
472. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 573.
473. Id.
474. RICHARDS, supra note 201, at 83.
475. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571.
476. Id. at 572.
477. Richards, supra note 418, at 1523.
478. Sarah Rippy, US State Comprehensive Privacy Law Comparison, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIV.
PRO. (Mar. 22, 2021), https://iapp.org/resources/article/state-comparison-table/ [https://perma.
cc/YBG3-J42K]; CONGR. RSCH. SERV., WATCHING THE WATCHERS: A COMPARISON OF PRIVACY
BILLS IN THE 116TH CONGRESS 1, 3 (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/
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special protections for intimate information to protect the values
that sexual privacy secures and to prevent certain harms to people’s
well-being, including their ability to work, study, get loans, obtain
insurance, and find housing. Those protections should include
limitations on collection and the recognition of no-collection zones.
We should widen the available remedies to include injunctive relief.
This Article aims to begin the conversation about why a new
compact for sexual privacy is needed and how we might go about
doing that.
LSB10441 [https://perma.cc/GE44-XBCK].
